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The purpose of this thesis is to identify and discuss
the key preaward problems encountered in engineering support
services contracts and how these problems might be avoided in
order to improve the contracting process. The research was
conducted by a review of directives and policy guidance,
field interviews with Government and Defense Industry
personnel, and visits with key individuals involved in source
competition and selection initiatives. The intent of the
study was to analyze source selection criteria, ascertain
problems and issues encountered, and make recommendations
that offer viable solutions to the contract award process.
This study also recommends areas for future study that may
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A. AREA OF RESEARCH
Engineering support services performed by Government
contractors ensure more efficient and effective operation of
weapon systems, equipment, components, and related software.
These nonpersonal services, through which no Government
supervision or direction of contractor employees takes place,
are typically performed by a manufacturer's engineers,
technicians, and field service representatives at either a
manufacturer's plant or at on-site defense locations [Ref.
l:encl. (4)]. The development of new technologies within the
Navy over the past two decades has often outstripped in-house
technical capability. Thus the use of engineering support
services is often a legitimate and economical way to meet
mission requirements. This research will examine key
problems in engineering support services contracts, focusing
on the development of preaward source selection criteria
within the Navy. In addition, engineering support contract
issues such as cost realism, quality, and the use of
uncompensated overtime will be examined. Lastly, an
appropriate source selection structure for engineering
support services contracts will be presented.
This research was accomplished primarily through field
interviews and telephone conversations with cognizant
Government and Defense Industry personnel. In addition,
selected Government data bases were accessed to provide data
useful for this study.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
What are the key problems in engineering support
services contracts and how might these problems be avoided in
order to improve the contracting process?
2. Subsidiary Research Questions
a. What are engineering support services contracts
and when are they used?
b. What problems are encountered in source
competition and selection for engineering support
services contracts?
c. What issues arise when developing evaluation
criteria?
d. What are appropriate evaluation factors (Section
M of the Request For Proposal) for engineering
support services contracts?
C. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this research is to examine and answer
these questions. By doing so, a qualitative insight will be
provided for Navy acquisition managers as to source selection
planning for engineering support services contracts.
D. SCOPE OF THESIS
The research focused on the source selection process
leading up to contract award. Detailed analysis of postaward
contract administration procedures were excluded. The study
is an assessment of current problems and issues in source
competition and selection for engineering support services
contracts. An appropriate source selection structure is




The research data were collected from field interviews
and telephone conversations with cognizant Government and
Defense Industry personnel. Interviewees were queried about
problems encountered in source competition and selection for
engineering support services contracts. Questions included:
1 . Industry:
a. Should past contractor performance be included in
source selection criteria?
b. Do you encounter problems in interpreting
Statements of Work? If so, what kind?
c. Should the Navy procure engineering support
services under the best value method or low cost,
technically acceptable method?
d. What are the key problems encountered in
contractor proposals for uncompensated overtime
and how might they be solved?
e. What contract types are appropriate for
engineering support services procurements?
f. Should contractor adoption of Total Quality
Management (TQM) principles be included in source
selection criteria or award fee evaluation
criteria?
g. Does the Government do an adequate job of
preparing independent cost estimates?
h. What contracting techniques are helpful in
improving industry-Government communication
within the engineering support services arena?
i. What improvements would you add to the source




a. Do you include past contractor performance in
source selection criteria?
b. Do you include contractor adoption of TQM
principles in source selection criteria?
c. What innovative techniques have you used in
developing source selection criteria?
d. Under what circumstances do you use the best
value method or the low cost, technically
acceptable method?
e. What contract types are appropriate for
engineering support services procurements?
f
.
How do you prepare independent cost estimates?
g. What are the key problems encountered in
contractor proposals for uncompensated overtime
and how might they be solved?
h. What contract administration lessons learned can
be employed in the source selection process to
improve the acquisition process?
F. ORGANIZATION
Chapter I defined the research problem and its
importance. The objective, scope, and methodology of the
thesis were also presented. Included in this chapter were
basic interview questions for industry and Government that
will serve as a framework for the study.
Chapter II describes what engineering support services
are and when they are used.
Chapter III will focus upon engineering support services
source selection problems. Particular emphasis will be upon
the responses received from industry and Government.
Chapter IV presents analysis of key issues developed
through research and interviews with industry and Government
personnel
.
Chapter V provides conclusions based upon findings and
recommendations regarding source competition and selection
for engineering support services contracts. Areas of study
that warrant further research are also identified.
1 1 . BACKGROUND
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will provide background information and a
general description of what engineering support services are
and when they are used. Current regulations and statutes
governing these services will be synopsized. A general
overview of the source selection planning process will also
be presented.
B. FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION (FAR)
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) part 37 (Service
Contracting) contains the current Federal regulations
governing engineering support services (ESS) contracts. ESS
contracts contain both nonpersonal services contract and
service contract characteristics. The FAR defines a
nonpersonal service contract as [Ref. 2:p. 37-1]:
. . . a contract under which the personnel rendering the
services are not subject, either by the contract's terms
or by the manner of its administration, to the
supervision and control usually prevailing in
relationships between the Government and its employees.
On the other hand, a personal services contract means a
contract, that, by its express terms or as administered,
makes the contractor personnel appear, in effect,
Government employees.
The FAR also defines a service contract as [Ref. 2:p. 37-
U:
. . . a contract that directly engages the time and
effort of a contractor whose primary purpose is to
perform an identifiable task rather than to furnish an
end item of supply. A service contract can cover
services performed by either professional or
nonprofessional personnel.
ESS contracts are also subject to the Service Contract
Act (SCA) of 1965 (41 U.S.C. 351-357), which provides for
minimum wages and fringe benefits for certain nonsalaried
personnel [Ref. 2:p. 37-2]. Bona fide engineers and other
salaried professionals are not subject to the SCA, which is
implemented in the services contracting process through
Department of Labor (DOL) wage determinations. A typical ESS
contractor has half or more of its personnel subject to SCA
provisions. One important distinction between hourly-wage
employees subject to the SCA and those salaried employees
that are not is the requirement for SCA-covered employees to
be paid overtime for any hours worked in excess of a standard
40 hour work week. Salaried personnel, by comparison, are
not required to be compensated by their employers for
overtime hours worked. This practice of uncompensated
overtime is a major issue in the ESS contracting arena that
will he examined in later chapters.
Inherent in ESS contracting is the fact that the
Government is contracting out a substantial amount of
engineering and technical work that at one time had been
performed in-house. In the 1940s and 1950s the Armed
Services had extensive arsenals, shipyards, laboratories, and
other facilities dedicated to research, development, and
8
production of munitions, ordinance, and weapons platforms.
Since then the emphasis has shifted away from in-house
accomplishment of these engineering and technical functions.
Certain strategic and tactical analyses have been contracted
out along with more mundane management support services.
Examples of these contracts, which often run into the tens of
millions of dollars, include value engineering analyses,
development of configuration management data bases, design
and support services for flight testing operations, and life
cycle support of computer based systems. Advanced Navy
systems, such as the Aegis cruiser and Tomahawk cruise
missile, have received engineering, technical, and
operational support through ESS contracts.
Contractor support services, of which engineering support
services are a subsector, have been described as an $8
billion annual business within the Department of Defense
(DOD) . Contracts for these services have grown at an
estimated two to threefold rate over the past ten years.
Within the Navy Field Contracting System, most Navy research
and development centers, ordinance stations, weapons support
centers, and regional contracting centers acquire engineering
support services to meet Navy mission requirements. Table I
summarizes total contract actions and obligated dollars for
Navy Field Contracting System activities in Fiscal Year 1989.
Naval Air Systems Command and Naval Sea Systems Command, two
9
headquarters activities not included in the Navy Field
Contracting System, also contract for engineering support
services amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars.
C. WHAT ARE ENGINEERING SUPPORT SERVICES?
Unlike procurement of hardware and supplies, acquisition
of engineering and technical services involves the buying of
a level of effort from a contractor. With these services the
Government is buying expertise, knowledge, and time; this
expertise and knowledge are very difficult to quantify and
can only be qualified through personnel educational and work
background requirements written into the solicitation [Ref.
TABLE I
LISTING OF ALL ENGINEERING SERVICE CONTRACTS MADE BY
THE NAVY FIELD CONTRACTING SYSTEM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1989
ACTIVITY CONTRACT ACTIONS OBLIGATED $
Naval Ocean Systems 1066 $ 782,432,000
Center, San Diego, Ca.
Naval Weapons Center, 341 $ 229,342,000
China Lake, Ca.
Naval Underwater Systems 1198 $ 191,671,000
Center, Newport, R.I.
Naval Regional Contracting 358 $ 139,565,000
Center, San Diego Detach-
ment, Long Beach, Ca.
Naval Regional Contracting 1025 $ 118,970,000
Center, Philadelphia, Pa.




ACTIVITY CONTRACT ACTIONS OBLIGATED $
Naval Air Development Ctr., 586 $ 65,523,000
Warminster . Pa.
Naval Supply Center, Norfolk, 544 $ 63,645,000
Va.
Naval Engineering Services 492 $ 60,430,000
Unit. Philadelphia, Pa.
Naval Training Systems Ctr., 235 $ 59,749,000
Orlando, Fl
.
D.W. Taylor Naval Ship R&D 421 $ 55,537,000
Center, Bethesda, Md.
Naval Surface Weapons Center, 275 $ 47,027,000
Dahlgren, Va.
Other Activities 1941 $ 216,870,000
TOTALS: 8880 $2,111,294,000
Source: Supply Systems Command
3:p. 15]. Most Statements of Work (SOW) are broadly worded,
allowing the Navy the flexibility to redefine tasks for
accomplishment while staying within the scope of work of the
contract. Unlike contracts for hardware, supplies, and other
tangible end items, the source selection criteria for ESS
contracts centers on a completely different set of criteria.
For example, the Navy will emphasize educational and work
experience of senior and key personnel who will guide the
contract effort as a key selection criterion. The
11
contractor's demonstrated technical expertise, as shown
through past contract performance and its technical approach
in performing sample tasks, will also be scrutinized in the
source selection process. The engineering support services
industry is highly competitive by nature. Some people term
this competition "cutthroat". In laying out a source
selection plan, the Navy and other Government agencies
frequently encounter the problem of how to discriminate
between contractors offering low cost, technically acceptable
proposals and contractors offering higher cost, superior
technical proposals exceeding the minimum acceptable
requirements defined in source selection criteria. Navy
policy has allowed contracting officers and source selection
authorities to select vendors that provide a "best value" or
"greater value" to the Navy. In such cases, a proposal
meeting solicitation requirements with the lowest price may
not be selected if award to a higher priced proposal affords
the Government a greater overall benefit. At the same time a
large number of Navy contracts have been awarded in recent
years using a low cost, technically acceptable source
selection criteria method. The appropriate use of these
vastly different source selection criteria methods is a major
issue in the ESS arena that will be examined in subsequent
chapters. In summary. Navy policy on ESS contracting is "to
12
strive to make sound business decisions, always considering
cost and performance objectives." [Ref. 3:p. 15]
D. WHEN ARE ENGINEERING SUPPORT SERVICES CONTRACTS USED?
A requirement for engineering support services is
originated when a program office or other Navy activity
defines a requirement for engineering or technical
capabilities not available in-house or at another Navy or DOD
activity. ESS contracts may be used in those cases where the
task to be performed involves the application of skills not
available in-house or such skills would not be economical or
feasible to develop. An analysis also has to be made as to
whether the requirement can be met by the use of other Navy
or DOD resources, including field activities or Navy
laboratories. A Statement of Work (SOW) must be prepared
that reflects minimum needs and does not require the
contractor to perform any of the basic and control
responsibilities of the Navy activity. The requirements
originator must clearly describe the need for ESS and justify
its use. The requirement needs to be approved and funded
early to permit orderly acquisition planning.
Requirements originators will often take an active role
in ESS contract administration. The procuring contracting
officer, in tandem with the contracting officer's technical
representative (COTR) assigned in the contract, will oversee
postaward contract performance. The COTR is responsible for
13
data deliverables and is the agent that certifies that the
Government has received satisfactory technical performance
from the contractor [Ref. 3:p. 16]. COTRs often serve on
source selection evaluation teams and can provide
perspectives on postaward issues that can be addressed in the
source selection process.
E . SUMMARY
Chapter II provided background information concerning
Navy contracting for engineering support services. The FAR
defines ESS contracts as containing both nonpersonal services
contract and service contract characteristics. ESS contracts
are used in instances where a requirement exists for
engineering or technical expertise not available in-house or
at other Navy or DOD resources.
As was shown in this chapter, requirements originators
play an important role in preparing a Statement of Work and
later participating in postaward contract administration.
Chapter III will present the organizational structure for
source selection planning, focusing on the principal
preproposal activities and the milestones of the source
selection process itself. Source selection evaluation
criteria used by the Navy will be examined and compared with
evaluation criteria used by the Army, Air Force, and National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
14
III. ENGINEERING SUPPORT SERVICES SOURCE
SELECTION PROBLEMS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will examine problems encountered in
competitive source evaluation and selection for engineering
support services (ESS) procurements. First, acquisition
planning will be examined. Second, the development of a
source selection plan and appropriate source selection
criteria will be examined. Lastly, issues in evaluating
contractor proposals and awarding ESS contracts will be
explored, focusing on viewpoints of cognizant Government and
industry personnel voiced during field interviews and
telephone conversations. Improvements to the ESS source
selection process offered by both parties will be outlined.
B. ACQUISITION PLANNING
As with all acquisitions, a well thought out ESS
acquisition plan is essential to successful contract
execution and resulting defense readiness. Considered within
the acquisition planning process are requirements
determination, examination of options and objectives,
requirements approval, and the organization of an acquisition
team to prepare an acquisition requirements package to the
contracting officer. A formal acquisition plan must be
submitted to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
15
(Shipbuilding and Logistics) (ASN (S & L)) for ESS contracts
of $10 million or greater. Even for smaller procurements, a
detailed acquisition plan should be formulated. Good
acquisition planning will give consideration to the entire
procurement process, considering all elements: management,
technical expertise, availability of resources, desired
results, and cost [Ref. 3:p. 16]. In this "balancing act"
process, the acquisition team must sort out conflicting
priorities. With an austere funding environment continuing
within DOD, avoidance of expensive programs while obtaining a
high level of technical performance are major considerations
in ESS planning.
The acquisition planning team will be comprised of
technical personnel (including the contracting officer's
technical representative (COTR) assigned), contracting
officer, legal personnel, pricing and cost analysts, and
other support personnel. Among the primary factors they will
consider in the acquisition planning process include:
acquisition/program tasking history, type of contract,
funding, kinds of contract vehicles, program schedules,
procurement method, maximization of competition, contract
incentives, lead times, source selection methodology/criteria
and contract administration [Ref. 3:p. 17-18].
Table II outlines generic Navy Regional Contracting
Center (NRCC) , San Diego Detachment, Long Beach, Ca.
16
contracting timeliness for competitive non-restricted
acquisitions originating from requirements of Pacific
Missile Test Center (PMTC) , Point Mugu, Ca. As this
table illustrates, the total award elapsed calendar time
via critical paths is 24 months and 21 days. From the
TABLE I I
GENERIC NRCC, SAN DIEGO DETACHMENT, LONG BEACH, CA
.
CONTRACTING TIMELINES IN ACTUAL WORKING DAYS (ASSUMED














RESPONSIBLE PARTY/ACTION REQUIRED ELAPSED TIME
PMTC-1: Requirement determined
PMTC-2: Examine options/objectives 10
PMTC-3: Obtain directorate approval 3
of requirement
PMTC-4: Organize and instruct ARPP 5
Team
PMTC-5: Prepare acquisition require- 52
ments package (ARP)




PMTC-8: Prepare white paper and 5
brief Commander, PMTC
PMTC-9: Review, QA, and update of ARP 5
PMTC 10: Prepare and mail ARP to NRCC 2























LB-2: Control number assigned
LB-3: PR screened and buying^
section assigned
LB-4: PR review by negotiation
supervisor
LB-5: Individual negotiator assigned
LB-6: Negotiator review of PR
LB-7: Small business and competitive
revi ew
LB-8: Prepare and mail info request
to PMTC
LB-9(PMTC): Receive request and
develop info needed by
NRCC
LB-IO(PMTC): Prepare/mail response to
NRCC
LB-11: Submit AP for approval
LB-12: Draft presol i ci tat ion docu-
mentation (including J & A)
LB/CBD-1: Synopsis runs in CBD for
15 calendar days
LB-14: Presol i ci tat ion approvals
and sole source decision
LB-15: Solicitation draft prepared
by negotiator
LB-16: Type and proof solicitation












DATE RESPONSIBLE PARTY/ACTION REQUIRED
17NOV88 LB-19: Receive technical questions
from offerors
17NOV88 LB-19A: Submit proposals (in 45
days with questions or
amendments
)
02DEC88 LB-20: Consolidated questions sent
to PMTC
09DEC88 LB-21(PMTC): Develop answers to
contractors' questions





28DEC88 LB-23: Prepare and mail solicita-
tion amendment to offerors
05JAN89 LB-24: Proposals submitted
19JAN89 LB-25: Receive t echni cal /pri ce
proposal
s
19JAN89 LB-26: Technical proposals to
PMTC for technical evalu-
at i on
19JAN89 LB-27: Prepare and send request
to DCAA for field pricing
repor t
26JAN89 DCAA-1: DCAA prepares and sends
audit reports to NRCC
30JAN89 LB-28(PMTC): Technical evaluation
completed by PMTC
requestor
02MAR89 LB-29: Technical evaluation
returned by PMTC to NRCC








DATE RESPONSIBLE PARTY/ACTION REQUIRED
15MAY89 LB-31: Prepare prenegot iat ion
business clearance
ELAPSED TIME
25MAY89 LB-32: Prenegot iat ion business
clearance goes to CRB
02JUN89 LB-33: Over $16 million ($8
million if award to other
than low offeror): prenegoti-
ation business clearance to
NAVSUP
09JUN89 NAVSUP-1: NAVSUP approves and returns 22
prenegot iat ion business
cl earance
09JUN89 NAVSUP-2: Over $40 million ($20 5
million if award to other
than low offeror): pre-
negotiation business
clearance to ASN (S&L)
16JUN89 ASN-1: ASN (S&L) approves and returns 22
prenegot i at i on business
cl earance
19JUL89 LB-34 : Receive prenegot i at ion business
c 1 earance
19JUL89 LB-35: Conduct technical and cost 15
nego t i at i ons
09AUG89 LB-36: Best and final request to 4
offerors
15AUG89 LB-37: Best and final response from 15
offerors
06SEP89 LB-38: Best and final proposals to 5
PMTC for final technical
evaluat i on




DATE RESPONSIBLE PARTY/ACTION REQUIRED
160CT89 LB-40(PMTC): Technical evaluation
results received by
NRCC
230CT89 LB-41: Prepare pos tnegot iat ion
business clearance
230CT89 LB-42: Approved prenegot iat ion
objectives achieved
02NOV89 LB-43: Postnegot iat ion business
clearance goes to CRB
09NOV89 LB-44: Over $16 million ($8 million
if award other than low
offeror): pos tnegot i at ion
business clearance to NAVSUP
17NOV89 NAVSUP-3: Over $40 million ($20
million if award to other
than low offeror): post-
negotiation business
clearance to ASN (S&L)
17NOV89 NAVSUP-4: NAVSUP approves and
returns pos tnegot i at ion
business clearance
24NOV89 ASN-2: ASN (S&L) approves and
returns postnegot i at ion
business clearance
28DEC89 LB-45: Receive postnegot iat ion
business clearance
28DEC89 LB-46: Prepare award documentation
03JAN90 LB-47: Type and proof award docu-
mentat ion









DATE RESPONSIBLE PARTY/ACTION REQUIRED ELAPSED TIME
17JAN90 LB-49: Contract signed by 3
contractor and contracting
off i cer
22JAN90 LB-50: Three-day hold for 3
Congressional announcement
(over $3 mi 1 1 ion)
25JAN90 LB-51: Announcement of award
*Total award elapsed time via critical paths:
24 months, 21 days
Key to abbreviations used ;
ARPP: Acquisition requirements package preparation
ASN (S&L): Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Shipbuilding and
Logi sties)
CBD: Commerce Business Daily
CRB : Contract Review Board
DCAA: Defense Contract Audit Agency
J & A: Justification and Approval
LB: Navy Regional Contracting Center, San Diego Detachment,
Long Beach, Ca.
NAVSUP: Naval Supply Systems Coounand, Washington, D.C.
PMTC: Pacific Missile Test Center, Point Mugu, Ca.
Source: Pacific Missile Test Center
determination of a requirement through the award
announcement, 71 action steps are included in this acquisi-
tion planning and source selection process. To enhance
22
communication between technical codes and the Navy Regional
Contracting Center (NRCC) contracting officer, PMTC also
developed contracting time lines for sole source, small
business set aside, small disadvantaged business set aside,
and 8(a) set aside ESS procurements.
C. CONTRACT TYPES
The two most common contract types chosen for Navy ESS
acquisitions are cost-reimbursement and time and materials
contracts. Cost-reimbursement contracts provide for payment
of all allowable and allocable costs incurred. Most Navy
contracts for development work or work of a highly technical
nature are either cost- plus-fixed -fee (CPFF) or cost-plus
award-fee (CPAF) in the ESS arena. The researcher found no
instances of cos t -plus -incent ive -fee (CPIF) contracts used in
Navy ESS acquisitions. Both Government and industry
personnel are in general agreement that CPIF contracts are
more suited for hardware acquisitions where an established
cost history is available.
A CPFF contract permits contracting for efforts that
otherwise might present too great a risk to contractors, but
it provides the contractor only a minimum incentive to
control costs (Ref. l:p. 16-6]. Contracts for flight test
design and analysis, for instance, are usually CPFF due to
uncertainty of the mix and quantity of labor hours required
to perform this highly technical effort.
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CPAF contracts are the preferred contract type when a
high level of Government-contractor interaction is
anticipated and the Government also wants to incentivize
contractor performance. CPAF contracts are not normally used
for ESS contracts of $40 million or more unless permission is
obtained by ASN (S&L). An example of a predominantly CPAF
contract for ESS is a delivery order type contract between
Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, Ca. and Comarco, Inc.,
Weapons Support Division, Ridgecrest, Ca. This contract
contains a generic Statement of Work calling for the
contractor to furnish the necessary labor, equipment, and
material to deliver studies and evaluations associated with
weapons system (and related items) effectiveness analysis and
design analysis. The contract also calls for technical
information services, documentation services, and program
management support. The level of effort calls for minimum
hours (45,000), estimated hours (540,000), and maximum hours
(900,000) to accomplish the delivery orders. Estimated cost,
maximum award fee, and total estimated cost and award fee are
also delineated for the minimum, estimated, and maximum
hours. Unique to this contract is the estimated 80 percent
use of CPAF delivery orders and 20 percent use of firm-fixed-
price (FFP) delivery orders. Under the contract terms, the
contractor does not earn award fees for any effort performed
24
under FFP delivery orders. Profit on FFP delivery orders is
negotiated separately for each delivery order.
The FAR states that a time and materials (T&M) contract
may be used only when it is not possible at the time of
placing a contract to estimate accurately the extent or
duration of the work or to anticipate costs with any
reasonable degree of confidence [Ref. l:p. 16-13]. For
example, a T & M contract might be used for development of a
configuration data base. A T & M contract provides no
positive profit incentive to the contractor for cost control
or labor efficiency [Ref. l:p. 16-13]. The principal driver
of costs in all ESS contracts is direct labor hours expended.
Although the fixed hourly rate in a T & M contract offers
great appeal to cost-conscious Government personnel, a "blank
check" exists whereby a contractor can invoice the Government
at the rate set forth in the contract for all hours worked,
perhaps 48 or more hours per week for some employees [Ref.
4:p. 12]. Once the contractor recovers all wages and
indirect expenses, the full hourly billing rate under a T & M
contract is 100 percent profit. Thus appropriate Government
surveillance of contractor performance is required to prevent
abuse of this system and to give reasonable assurance that
efficient methods and effective cost controls are being used
[Ref. l:p. 16-13].
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Fixed -price contracts are seldom used in Navy ESS
acquisitions. In general most contractors are reluctant to
assume a high degree of cost responsibility for development
work or other work where the extent, duration, or costs of
the effort are unclear. The Army Tank-Automotive Command
(TACOM) , Warren, Mi. has awarded fixed-price-incentive-firm
(FPIF) contracts for systems technical support (STS) for the
Army's Heavy Forces Modernization Program. Three years ago
the Army decided to compete STS for its tanks. Having
accumulated several years of experience in the number of
labor hours required for engineering, logistics, and program
management efforts, TACOM decided to issue a FPIF contract,
as they believed they had a reasonable basis for predicting
the labor hour mix. In issuing the solicitation, TACOM gave
offerors copies of work directives for the first year and an
estimate of the labor mix. In one case, TACC^ and the
contractor agreed to adjust the contract ceiling price,
target cost, and target profit downward by 20 percent when
the contractor only used 80 percent of the labor hours called
for in the FPIF contract.
D. DEVELOPMENT OF SOURCE SELECTION CRITERIA
In setting up a solicitation, Statements of Work (SOWs)
must permit full and open competition and include
restrictions only to the extent necessary to satisfy the
needs of the Government. [Ref. 5] The underlying premise is
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that the Government gets a better deal from competition.
Each solicitation must include a statement of all significant
factors, including price and quality, which the agency head
reasonably expects to consider in evaluating the proposals
and the relative importance assigned to each of these
factors. The award will be based solely on the factors
specified in the solicitation.
Source selection criteria must be identified early in the
acquisition process. [Ref. 5] The FAR requires price and
quality to be addressed in every source selection. Price is
not required to be the controlling factor in the source
selection decision. Quality can be addressed in terms of
technical excellence, management capability, personnel
qualifications, schedule compliance, past performance, and
related factors. Since the Government is looking
prospectively at performance, other factors such as cost
realism may be included. While the lowest price or lowest
total cost to the Government is properly the deciding factor
in many source selections, in certain acquisitions the
Government may select an offeror whose proposal offers the
greatest value in terms of performance and other factors.
For instance, the Government might procure highly technical
services such as flight test analyses on a best value basis
while less technical services, such as a predominantly
drafting/computer operator effort, might be procured on a low
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cost, technically acceptable basis. In summary, the FAR
requires the source selection decision to be based upon
price, quality, and any other factors tailored to the
acqui s i t ion.
In practice, the requiring activity submits to the
contracting officer those items it wants considered as
pertinent to the award. [Ref. 5] Price and quality are then
worked against each other. Quality or price can then be set
up as the overriding factor. In ESS procurements made under
the best value method, the relative weights of quality and
price are typically 60 percent and 40 percent respectively,
as per guidance from ASN (S & L). The Air Force and Army
procure ESS using the best value method predominantly. Both
services often state that contract award will be based "on an
integrated assessment of quality and price." On occasion the
Army has used relative weights of 70 percent and 30 percent
for quality and price respectively. The Navy has considered
prohibiting the assignment of a numerical score to the
proposed cost or price in best value source selections.
Appendix A contains a draft policy memorandum originated by
ASN (S & L) which would abolish such scoring. If adopted,
such a policy would generally bring Navy ESS contracting
procedures into line with the Army, Air Force, NASA, and
other Federal agencies.
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Once the source selection criteria are disclosed, the
Government is fairly locked in. [Ref. 5J With tight budgets
there is growing pressure to make price the controlling
factor in award decisions. There is no requirement that
cost-reimbursement contracts be awarded on lowest offered
price but there is much momentum that way. If the requiring
activity wants ESS procured on a best value basis, it must
persuade the contracting officer to structure the
solicitation to favor these other criteria over cost the
entire way through the acquisition process. If the
solicitation says price will control the award decision, the
Government cannot get to the end of the acquisition cycle and
then award to a higher priced offeror. The Government is
then attempting to award in violation of the disclosed
criteria. Thus the requiring activity must articulate to the
contracting officer the significance of cost in terms of what
a good value will be, how much the requiring activity is
willing to pay, and what the estimate of cost should be.
In developing a source selection plan, primary
consideration should be given to which offeror can perform
the contract in a manner most advantageous to the Government.
[Ref. 5] The Army and Air Force often use a formal source
selection model for procurements exceeding $10 million. An
Army or Air Force General typically serves as the source
selection authority (SSA), assisted by a source selection
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advisory council (SSAC) and a source selection evaluation
board (SSEB). The SSA decides which offeror will get the
award after receiving input from SSEB committees on the
technical and cost review of proposals, coupled with the
comments of the SSAC. The Navy model for ESS procurement
makes the contracting officer the SSA unless a formal source
selection model is chosen for an ESS procurement in the
hundreds of millions of dollars. Information accumulated by
the contracting officer includes business clearances, price
analyses, independent government cost estimates, reviews of
technical proposals, findings of review boards, and various
approvals from higher authority. The goal of the contracting
officer is to make a sound business judgment using the
information gathered.
If evaluation criteria are changed after the solicitation
is issued, protests may result. [Ref. 5] If a change in
requirements, technology, or marketplace conditions occurs,
the solicitation may be revised by amendments to the Request
For Proposals (RFP). However, new proposals and
corresponding best and final offers (BAFOs) will have to be
submitted by offerors, lengthening the procurement cycle and
increasing contractor bid and proposal (B & P) costs. A
protestor may charge that the criteria were changed to favor
an offeror that could not win the award otherwise. The use
of draft RFPs and presol i c i tat ion bidders conferences have
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been helpful in identifying such changes prior to issuance of
the RFP.
Technical evaluations conducted by the requiring activity
should be documented and include the basis for evaluation.
[Ref. 5] To determine a competitive range, an analysis of
technically acceptable and unacceptable proposals should be
made, including an assessment of each offeror's ability to
meet the technical requirements. In determining a
competitive range, the contracting officer can exclude those
offerors having no chance of award. The contracting officer
can award on initial proposals only if the award is made to
the low-priced offeror. This decision should only be made
for clear winners. If there are questions or concerns about
price or technical matters, then the contracting officer must
hold discussions with all offerors remaining in the
competitive range. Meaningful discussions must be held with
all offerors, informing each contractor of significant
deficiencies in its proposal. The technical evaluation
personnel can guide the contracting officer in initiating
discussions with a contractor if areas within the proposal
can be pointed out for improvement. The technical evaluators
can list specific questions which need to be cleared up in
discussions. Should the technical evaluation team believe
that there is no likelihood of improvements in proposals
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arising from discussions, this opinion can be relayed to the
contracting officer. In short, the Government needs to
discuss these details so it can make an informed decision in
selecting the offeror who will provide the best performance.
In grading each technical proposal, a summary of matrix or
qualitative rankings is made in relation to the best rating
possible. A summary of findings, with narrative comments
addressing the technical ratings, is then synopsized.
In making a determination of contractor responsibility,
the contracting officer can analyze the contractor's
performance record and record of integrity and business
ethics. [Ref. 5] A preaward survey (PAS) can be conducted
in which a Government plant representative office or the
contracting officer's own PAS team visits the contractor's
plant to observe personnel, facilities, and indicators of
financial backing. The Army and Air Force make extensive use
of their own PAS teams in the ESS arena. Their PAS teams
sometimes spend a week or more conducting a PAS at the
contractor's site. If the contract calls for engineering
support services to be performed at a Government facility,
then a plant visit would be counterproductive. Thus the
contracting officer has some latitude in using preaward
surveys as an information gathering tool.
Evaluation criteria can be stated in terms of fixed
weights or variable weights. [Ref. 5] Under a fixed weight
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system, four factors such as price, management, technical
capability, and prior performance may be chosen, with each
factor worth 25 percent. Four factor subcategories may be
worth 25 percent each. Under the variable weight method,
there may be some factors, particularly price, that the
Government does not want to fix. For instance, the
importance of cost or price as a factor will become greater
depending on the technical quality of the proposals.
Although the Government may want technical to be the
controlling factor, if two or more proposals are technically
very close, then price often becomes the determining factor
in making the award.
When the low cost, technically acceptable method (termed
"go/no go") is used, each factor is deemed good or no good.
[Ref. 5] A "go" on every factor is required to be considered
within the competitive range of acceptable offerors. A
General Accounting Office (GAO) decision ruled thai if
technical and management factors are "go/no go" in both
areas, then the award will be made to the lowest priced
offeror. Under the "go/no go" method, the source selection
criteria must be user-friendly and employ an English language
syntax fairly close to terms of act in the industry. In one
instance, the SOW required a handgun to discharge 5,000
rounds successfully. It was ruled that if the rounds were
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discharged successfully, the low-priced offeror won the
award
.
The source selection process allows the Government a
great deal of subjectivity in maximizing its freedom as an
evaluator. [Ref. 5] There is a tendency to have numerical
scoring systems where numbers are tallied and the highest
score wins. Disclosure of evaluation criteria and a concern
for fairness are important considerations, as the
Government's goal is to receive good offers. The SOW and the
wording of Request For Proposals (RFP) sections L
(Instructions to Offeror) and M (Evaluation Factors for
Award) must be user-friendly in nature. In section L, the
contracting officer asks for clear, detailed information
sufficient to evaluate proposals in accordance with the
source selection criteria. In section M, the evaluation
criteria and their relative weight are stated. The
contracting officer does not have to disclose whether scoring
by numbers, colors, or adjectives will be used. Draft RFPs
can be used to solicit industry input regarding the wording
of the RFP. Sample work directives can also be included in
the draft RFP for industry comment. In essence, the
Government needs to articulate what it wants the offeror to
perform while informing the offeror of how its proposal will
be evaluated.
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Once the evaluation criteria have been chosen, a scoring
system must be selected. [Ref. 5] It is acceptable to rate
proposals with adjectives or color schemes (blue, green,
yellow and red, for instance, to denote outstanding,
acceptable, marginal, and unacceptable ratings, respectively)
instead of numerical scores. No matter which scoring system
is used, there must be some discussion of the significance or
meaning of the results of the tallied scores. The goal is
for the contracting officer (or SSA for formal source
selections) to be fully informed about the relative merits of
the proposals. Thus narrative statements such as "good",
"less good", or "poor" can be used by evaluators to amplify
scores assigned to proposals. Numerical scoring does not
necessarily transform the process into a more objective
process. In one protest, 1000 available points were broken
down into five-point blocks. The protestor unsuccessfully
challenged the five-point blocks, saying the scorer could not
differentiate between different offerors. GAO has ruled that
a 10-8-5-2-0 scoring scheme for an evaluated subfactor is
acceptable. GAO has also stated that technical scores must
be considered by the contracting officer/Source Selection
Authority (SSA) to determine the significance attached to
scores given by evaluators. Thus the contracting officer/SSA
must be fully informed about the relative merits of the
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proposals if for some reason he or she does not understand
the scoring schemes and what they represent.
In close calls, a fully informed decision takes on added
meaning. [Ref. 5] If two contractors receive "blue"
(outstanding) scores or one offeror receives 96 points to
another offeror's 98 points, cost or price now becomes a very
important matter in this "fully informed" issue. The
contracting officer/SSA must now decide which proposal
represents the best value to the Government. The contracting
officer/SSA might decide that an offeror's quality assurance
program or Government-furnished property program is superb,
making the higher scores in either of these categories worth
a great deal to the Government. If two proposals score out
at 96 and 97 points respectively in a $10 million
procurement, it might cost the Government an additional $1
million to obtain one extra point in scoring. In such cases,
judgments have to be made about which offeror scored higher
or lower in key evaluation factor/subf actor areas such as
personnel, management, quality, and past performance. In
evaluating resumes of program managers and other key
personnel who will guide the work effort, the aforementioned
blue/green/yellow/red scoring system can be used. An
outstanding resume corresponds to a "blue" score. A highly
experienced individual with poor education and no degree
could be given a "green" score. Narrative comments could
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include, "This employee was rated 'green' because of
experience but degree is lacking." The contracting
officer/SSA can then make a subjective award decision given
this proposal evaluation input.
In a recent GAO case regarding color scoring schemes, two
offerors each received twelve "blues" and two "greens" for
past performance. [Ref. 5] The contracting officer then
averaged these scores and rated both proposals "blue" for
past performance. With both offerors receiving identical
scores for technical merit, the low offeror then received the
award. The protestor claimed that the color scoring schemes
were too broad. He wanted the agency to use a strict
numerical scoring system, assigning scores by points or half-
points. The Comptroller General ruled that even numerical
scoring systems are only useful guides to intelligent
decision-making. They are not controlling in making an award
because they often reflect the evaluator's disparate,
subjective judgment. As long as the disclosed evaluation
criteria are followed, it is acceptable to use adjectives,
numbers, or colors for scoring schemes. Whatever scheme is
used, the contracting officer/SSA has to be able to
articulate the differences or similarities in the
proposal s
.
In providing input to the contracting officer/SSA,
evaluators should provide all the information available that
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will affect discussions or award. [Ref. 5] If a member of
the evaluation team views a resume that looks better than a
person he knows, the evaluator's misgivings should be
included in the narrative input to the contracting
officer/SSA. If the evaluation team believes it can obtain
better proposals than what they have seen, it should
recoBomend to the contracting officer that discussions be
held. In summary, an informed contracting officer/SSA can
make a fair decision in which the data obtained support the
conclus ions
.
E. SOURCE SELECTION ISSUES
During field interviews with cognizant Government and
industry personnel, a number of source selection issues were
raised. The research effort was narrowed down to the 12
following issues generally perceived by both parties to be
major problems in the ESS contracting process.
1. Should the industry practice known as uncompensated
overtime be banned or regulated?
Uncompensated overtime (UOT) occurs when services
firms bid for contracts in which professional employees will
work more than 40 hours a week yet are compensated based on a
40 hour work week. This is done in an effort to obtain a
competitive edge by lowering the hourly rates companies offer
the Government on contract proposals. When contractors
compete to provide services to the Government, their
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proposals include hourly costs of salaried employees, such as
engineers, scientists, and analysts [Ref. 6:p. 5]. As shown
in Appendix B, the billable amount to the contractor remains
the same if a salaried professional employee works a standard
48 hour work week instead of a 40 hour work week [Ref. 4:p.
10]. Whereas hourly-wage, non-engineer employees subject to
the Service Contract Act (SCA) of 1965 would receive overtime
pay for hours worked in excess of 40 per week, salaried
engineers and other professional employees exempt from the
Act work more hours while receiving the same salary when
their work week exceeds the 40 hour per week standard. This
controversial bidding practice has become commonplace in
today's highly competitive ESS arena. Despite efforts to
reach an agreement on the handling of UOT bidding, DOD
officials and representatives of the professional and
technical services industry remain far apart in reaching a
compromise.
The DOD Advisory Committee on Uncompensated Overtime was
mandated by Congress in the 1989 Defense Authorization Act.
The committee was tasked with the following requirement:
. . . establish criteria to ensure that proposals for
contracts for professional and technical services are
evaluated on a basis which does not encourage contractors
to propose mandatory uncompensated overtime for
professional and technical employees . . . (Section 804
of Public Law 100-456).
Through the use of UOT bidding culminating in contract
awards, contractors have forced their professional and
39
technical employees to work an average of 43 to 45 hours per
week without the benefit of overtime pay. Industry groups
say DOD, particularly the Navy, suffers from this practice
because it puts undue emphasis on price over quality.
Industry also contends that extending the work week beyond
the long established 40 hours per week standard leads to
subsequent fatigue, demoralization, errors, and gradual
degradation of the quality of professional services rendered.
While contractors admit they are not being forced to bid UOT
,
they generally claim that the contractor who fails to bid UOT
will be underbid by the competition. Their feeling is the
Government will choose the offeror with the lowest composite
average hourly cost.
The present position of DOD is not to outlaw the use of
UOT on ESS contracts, an outcome industry desires. Eleanor
Spector, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and chairwoman
of the special DOD Advisory Committee on Uncompensated
Overtime, has stated that industry's concerns are "overblown.
They want us to formally disallow it by regulation. That
would be interfering with the competitive marketplace."
[Ref. 7:p. 1] Mark Shultz, executive director of the
Professional Services Council (PSC) , Washington, D.C.,
countered that "it is highly appropriate for the Pentagon to
regulate and prohibit this practice as a matter of policy."
[Ref. 7:p. 1-2]
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Several contractors interviewed by the researcher contest
Ms. Specter's assertion that "industry is now generally
offering 43 to 45 hours per week per key employee." These
contractors assert offerors are presently bidding an average
48 to 50 hours per week per key employee compared to an
average 42 to 44 hours per week awarded. Furthermore, they
contend that firms proposing long work weeks, for instance 50
hours, are not always delivering these hours once they
receive the contract award. One contractor tasked with
performing contracted overtime hours allegedly had no
employees answering phones on Saturdays nor on weekdays
before 7:30 a.m. or after 4:30 p.m. Industry also asserts
that while the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) can
conduct time card checks at a contractor's plant, those hours
worked by an employee travelling on a plane cannot be
verified. Thus many contractors assert that UOT offers no
"free lunch" to the Government. They see the UOT issue as a
"smoke and mirrors game" that can hurt defense readiness if
the requiring activity cannot obtain satisfactory work from
the awardee.
2. The Navy should reveal more information about source
selection evaluation factors and subfactors used in
ESS contracting.
Several contractors that have dealt with the Army,
Air Force, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), and other Federal agencies state that Section M
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(Evaluation Factors For Award) of most Navy RFPs is far less
detailed than that of the other Services and agencies.
Although each contracting activity is tasked with revealing
the source selection criteria and their relative weights,
there is no one standard method of articulating this
requirement. Navy contractors particularly want to know the
actual percentages used for the relative weights of
cost/price, technical, management, past performance, and
other applicable evaluation criteria. They also want the
Navy to reveal more narrative details about the relative
importance of the evaluation factors and subfactors. One
contractor stated that the Navy "should tell me what they
want so I can propose what they want."
3. The Navy does not perform cost realism analyses for
ESS contracts effectively.
Industry contends that few Navy activities do an
adequate job of assessing the cost realism of contractor
proposals. First, industry asserts that requiring activities
should develop an independent cost baseline to use as a
yardstick for evaluating contractor proposals. Many
contractors assert that a large number of Government buying
personnel have never been to a cost/pricing course and do not
understand how a contractor builds cost, overhead, general
and administrative (G & A) expense, and profit into a
proposal while complying with cost accounting standards.
They say that if a requiring activity's cost estimating data
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base supports a $20.00 per hour labor rate for a particular
engineer, a $7.00 per hour proposed rate for that engineer
indicates that contractor is "fudging" costs. Industry also
asserts that some contractors are proposing $10.00 per hour
for a non-professional labor category subject to a Department
of Labor (DOL) wage determination of a $25.00 per hour
minimum wage. In some instances, contractors dispute the
wage determination, saying they will take up the matter with
DOL. Furthermore, industry says there is no penalty for
pulling such ploys or bidding too low. Some contractors
believe that offerors submitting proposals well outside the
requiring activity's cost baseline should be eliminated from
the competitive range due to nonrespons i veness . However,
some contractors feel "the Navy's bark is worse than its
bite" in the manner its contracting activities analyze the
cost realism of proposals.
Government personnel generally assert that industry
is its own worst enemy in the cost realism arena. They
assert offerors should submit good, "above board" cost
figures mirroring reality in their initial proposals. The
burden is on industry to cease the "gaming" of figures
contained in cost proposals, many government personnel feel.
4. Gaming techniques are employed by contractors when
significantly high weight is given to cost in the
evaluation criteria. Contractors can be expected to
provide very optimistic cost estimates when the
evaluation criteria is low cost, technically
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acceptable or when cost is weighted at 40 percent or
higher in best value procurements.
Both Government and industry agree that the low cost,
technically acceptable procurement method is valid for buying
"low tech" services where little or no engineering labor
effort is required. Contractors assert that while the low
cost, technically acceptable approach may be easier to award
than the best value method, it will lead to more "buying-in"
proposals from contractors submitting "lowball" bids.
Industry believes the procurement of professional and
technical services is suffering from a progressive
deterioration of the quality imperative in favor of the low
bid. Many contractors assert that the Navy should weigh cost
at no more than 30 percent in best value procurements, as was
the case prior to the tight budgets of the mid-1980s, when
cost was often weighted at ten to 30 percent. Some
Government personnel counter that contractors too often
employ "brochuremanship" in packaging their proposals and
thus making it difficult to discriminate between the relative
merits of technical proposals that are very close to one
another. Still, other Government personnel have a preference
for the best value method. Industry believes the use of the
best value evaluation and selection process strengthens the
contracting officer's role in the source selection process,
allowing an informed business to be made. Industry also
believes the best value method incentivizes contractors to
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Several contractors asserted that the formal source
selection process, where an informed SSA makes the award
decision, fosters better quality awards in high dollar value
procurements while adding greater fairness and objectivity to
the award decision. One contractor reconmiended that
commanding officers of Navy Regional Contracting Centers
(NRCCs) could serve as SSAs in a similar manner that Army and
Air Force Generals serve as SSAs in high dollar value
procurements
.
6. Navy procurement administrative lead time (PALT) has
continued to lengthen due to the growing number of
regulations and the increasing complexity of the
competitive procurement process.
Industry feels the Navy should be able to award
contracts within six to nine months after release of an RFP,
as the Army and Air Force have been consistently been able to
accomplish through strict adherence to contracting
milestones. Navy personnel counter that the Army and Air
Force have a large number of dedicated civilian and uniformed
personnel that allow them to realize better PALT than the
Navy. One contractor suggested that Navy business clearances
be approved shortly after the competitive range determination
so that PALT could be reduced. Another recommendation is
that the Navy should issue a draft RFP at the 18 month mark
of a three-year contract that will be recompeted. Industry
also believes contracting officers should allow sufficient
time for offerors to respond to issued RFPs . A 120 day
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so that PALT could be reduced. Another recommendation is
that the Navy should issue a draft RFP at the 18 month mark
of a three-year contract that will be recompeted. Industry
also believes contracting officers should allow sufficient
time for offerors to respond to issued RFPs. A 120 day
response period chosen up front, for instance, is more
effective than the practice of granting 30 day extensions for
offerors to submit proposals.
Industry also contends that the often multiyear Navy
acquisition cycle for ESS has increased the use of omnibus
type contracts, otherwise known as "umbrella" contracts.
These contracts, composed of generic SOWs , have delivery
orders issued for any number of independent and unrelated
technical organizations at any given time. Industry contends
that reduced PALT would allow the use of separate
requirements contracts rather than multiyear omnibus type
cont ract s .
7. The Navy has not captured past performance history in
situations requiring specialized and high-level
technical talent.
Both Government and industry are in agreement that
past performance is a valid source selection criterion. The
notion is to reward outstanding performers and penalize poor
performers so that overall quality will be enhanced.
Government contracting activities have been slow to capture
this past performance data and use it in a manner that will
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be fair and objective to offerors while limiting the
potential for protests. The Air Force has taken the lead
with its effort to create a Contractor Performance Assessment
Report (CPAR) data base to capture ESS performance data,
share these data among Air Force hardware commands, and
employ past contractor performance as a significant source
selection criterion. Several Navy activities are making
strides toward developing such a system, but other than the
Navy's Red-Yellow-Green one-year test program, progress has
been slow.
8. Should Total Quality Management (TQM) principles be
incorporated in evaluation criteria for ESS
contracts?
Incorporation of statistical process control,
continuous process improvement, and other tenets of Total
Quality Management have been incorporated in contracts for
production of hardware but have yet to play a major role in
ESS procurements. Both Government and industry have
encountered difficulty in applying what many call a
"philosophy" into a services environment where relatively few
end products are produced compared to a manufacturing
env i ronment
.
9. Should the contracting function be centralized or
decentralized for the acquisition of mission-specific
equipment and services, including research and
development (R & D)?
This issue was brought to the attention of the
researcher by a number of Government personnel. Several
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Government personnel interviewed had strong feelings that
mission requirements were not being met best when the
contracting function was located at a site apart from the
requiring activity's location. One interviewee stated:
Centralization of the contracting function, although
appearing to be efficient with the consolidation and
concentration of resources in Centers of Excellence,
tends to be parochial and often is not productive in
terms of support. The involvement and interplay between
program manager and contracting officer throughout the
preaward process, as envisioned by the Packard
Commission, is difficult if not impossible to achieve
because of the distance, both philosophically and
geographically, between the contracting office and the
cl i ent .
A number of Government personnel interviewed were
equally adamant that the centralization of the contracting
function to a high degree is the best use of Government
resources and allows more efficient procurement.
10. The Government should open a better dialogue with
prospective bidders through greater use of
prebidders conferences and draft RFPs requesting
industry input to solicitations.
Industry personnel interviewed were of the strong
opinion that these two tools were superb techniques in
fostering communication between the Government and offerors
prior to the release of an RFP. Both parties cited the use
of draft RFPs as a "superb mechanism" for obtaining industry
input on the wording of SOWs , clarification of sample work
directives, and other contract provisions proposed. Many
contractors felt the Government listened to their input and
acted upon their suggestions, as evidenced in the wording of
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RFPs released. Both Government and industry interviewees
felt the enhanced communication obtained through the use of
prebidders conferences and draft RFPs resulted in a RFP
largely free from modifications that would in turn result in
multiple rounds of best and final offer (BAFO) submissions.
11. The Navy needs to improve its debriefing conferences
for offerors not awarded a contract.
Navy contracting activities received a large amount
of criticism from industry for the way most of its
contracting activities conducted debriefing conferences.
Although some Navy debriefing conferences received good
marks, the overall quality of the feedback provided to
offerors was deemed substandard to the typical debriefing
conducted by the Army or Air Force. However, not all Army
and Air Force debriefings received high marks from industry.
Industry characterized excellent debriefings as
those which provided detailed written and oral feedback as to
the relative strengths and weaknesses of offerors' proposals.
Excellent debriefings were also described by industry as
nonconf rontat ional in tone. Poor debriefing conferences were
characterized by no written or oral feedback and tight-lipped
debriefing officials who did not want to answer questions
posed by losing offerors.
12. The current Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
should be amended to provide adequate recognition of
the technical and services industry and guidance on
the procurement of these services.
49
The Professional Services Council estimates that the
current FAR only covers about five percent of the dollars
spent for services. The professional and technical services
industry generates over $200 billion annually in revenue. Of
that total, the Navy procures approximately $8 billion
annually in engineering support services. The outlook for
the future is that ESS contracting actions and dollars
awarded will rapidly increase. The feeling from several
Government and industry interviewees is that services do not
receive the "visibility and glamour" of hardware
acquisitions, thus little policy is directed toward services
in the FAR.
In the absence of FAR coverage, periodic Navy policy
declarations on such issues as source selection and cost
realism, whether intended or not, appear conflicting to some
contracting activities and requiring activities. As a
result, some activities feel their ability to exercise sound
judgment based upon unique procurement situations has been
"handcuffed." They feel the award should be determined
locally by contracting individuals most familiar with the
requirements and should be based on the best interests of the
Government, all issues considered.
F. SUMMARY
This chapter has examined the development of acquisition
plans and source selection criteria used in evaluating
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proposals. Twelve pertinent issues in the ESS arena,
including cost realism, bidding of uncompensated overtime,
and growing procurement action lead time, were addressed from
the viewpoints of Government and industry interviewees.






This chapter presents the researcher's analysis and
findings pertaining to the 12 key issues explored in Chapter
III. In addition to conducting field and telephone
interviews with cognizant Government and industry personnel,
the researcher obtained ten Request For Proposals (RFPs), two
draft RFPs, and six source selection plans for engineering
support services (ESS) procurements from interviewees.
To obtain perspectives that might enhance Navy
procurement of ESS, the researcher also interviewed cognizant
Army, Air Force, and National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) personnel experienced in ESS
procurement for their respective agencies. Several of the
six contractors interviewed had submitted offers or had been
awarded Army or Air Force contracts. As a result, the manner
in which the Navy conducted source selections was often
compared by these contractors to Army and Air Force
solicitation and evaluation procedures.
Navy personnel attached to the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy (Shipbuilding and Logistics) (ASN (S &
L)), Naval Supply Systems Command, Naval Air Systems
Command, Naval Sea Systems Command, and the Military Sealift
Command were interviewed along with a cross section of Navy
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Field Contracting System activities. Although some specific
source selection information was considered too sensitive by
these activities to discuss, interviewees gave candid
opinions on key source selection issues and supplied generic
source selection plans, acquisition plans, and users' guides
for existing ESS contracts.
B. ANALYSIS
The following is the researcher's analysis of the 12 key
source selection issues noted in Chapter III:
1. Should the industry practice of uncompensated
overtime be banned or regulated?
The researcher found both Government and industry
personnel to be highly opinionated about this key ESS issue.
A representative sample of the comments expressed by Navy
personnel about this matter follows:
1. Uncompensated overtime (UOT) is a matter of pricing.
We do not encourage or discourage UOT. Eleanor Spector
has put the issue to bed. We want to make sure we get
what we are paying for with UOT, so we treat it as a
cost realism issue. Eleanor Spector says we won't get
in the middle of industry's pricing decisions.
2. Uncompensated overtime is a nightmare in contract
administration. We have problems with contractors
charging 40 hours first, with five hours of
uncompensated time coming later. The contractors are
trying to increase their cash flows.
3. Is it a Government function to police industry
practices? My personal opinion is that Government
should establish a level playing field with respect to
UOT.
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4. We have seen work weeks as high as 52 hours proposed.
We have strong doubts about proposals of 45 hours per
week or more.
A representative sample of the comments expressed by
Army, Air Force, and NASA personnel concerning UOT follows:
1. A Congressional staffer was wondering why the Army
doesn't have a problem with UOT like the Navy has. We
have never had any offers for UOT at this activity.
2. The Army has no policy with respect to UOT. It would
get us down the path to starting to manage companies.
As long as firms are offering against the same
requirement, it's their business. If a contractor
proposes a standard work week exceeding 40 hours, we
ask whether it is the standard way of running their
company. In a couple cases, there was no history or
credibility supporting a longer work week.
3. With UOT the Air Force will have the contractor spell
out how they will do it. We may tell offerors that the
normal work week is 40 hours. We may set a 44 hour
work week sometimes.
4. We have seen UOT in a couple small business proposals.
DCAA will look at whether UOT is a company policy that
is being adhered to.
5. In one RFP, we had all offerors propose a total of
2,000 hours of UOT in each year of operation. Offerors
were to furnish the company overtime policy, including
who is paid overtime and the rate, and describe the
accounting treatment of overtime. We told the offerors
in the RFP that it was the Government's intent to
evaluate the basic proposals based upon 53,000
productive labor hours of effort for each of the five
contract years. Offerors were required to submit their
proposals based on this estimate, but could submit an
additional, alternate approach if considered more
beneficial to the Government.
A representative sample of the comments expressed by
industry concerning UOT follows:
1. UOT is a symptom of an unprofessional culture. If a
contract requirement has any sophistication, NASA won't
allow UOT. A work week exceeding 40 hours may be
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productive for six to twelve months. Beyond a year of
contract performance, there are questions about UOT.
2. We are working a 50 hour work week at our firm. The
problem is not the work week. A firm is essentially
forced to bid UOT. It can't remain competitive
otherwi se
.
3. Bidding UOT is a form of smoke and mirrors. The long
term implications of this practice are not good for
requiring activities nor the professional and technical
services industry.
4. Uncompensated overtime is one of several gimmicks
contractors have devised to win awards.
Although Government and industry have not resolved the
matter of whether UOT should be banned or regulated, the
researcher found general consensus between both parties that
standard work weeks of 45 hours or more for professional
employees are undesirable for both Government and industry.
A point of diminishing marginal returns is reached where the
benefits of the "free" overtime hours the Government receives
are offset by the difficulty to quantify costs of Defense
Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) oversight of UOT, declining
employee morale, reduced surge capability, and increased
potential for sloppiness or errors in work performance. One
Navy activity requires contractors to guarantee the delivery
of uncompensated overtime proposed and also specify whether
UOT is being used to reduce direct labor costs or overhead
costs. Navywide adoption of this practice is recommended to
help insure greater cost realism in proposals.
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Navy activities should regulate UOT by stating in the RFP
that all offers will be evaluated based on a standard work
week. Although the 40 hour work week is the general
yardstick for white-collar professional employees in the
business sector, the Navy should not be prevented from
requiring a longer work week, such as 44 hours, if the needs
of the requiring activity are best met through that level of
effort over the life of the contract. Standard work weeks of
45 hours or more should be avoided unless requiring
activities can perform a cost-benefit analysis that justifies
its use in meeting mission requirements.
By requiring offerors to submit their proposals based on
the standard work week the Navy tailors to that acquisition,
a "level playing field" will be established which will
discourage "gaming". Offerors can be advised that an
additional, alternate approach can be submitted if considered
more beneficial to the Government. Several Federal agencies
have used this practice of specifying a standard work week
based on Government estimates to perform the required effort.
2. The Navy should reveal more information about source
selection evaluation factors and subfactors used in
ESS contracting.
In examining Section M (Evaluation Factors For Award)
of ten RFPs issued by Navy, Air Force, Army, and National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) activities, the
researcher found that Navy RFPs contained little discussion
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of evaluation subfactors compared to those of the Army, Air
Force, and NASA, Section M page lengths in Navy RFPs often
vary from one to three pages in ESS procurements compared to
three to nine pages typically found in Army, Air Force, and
NASA buys. In one instance. Section M of one Navy RFP was
less than one page length.
Although page length is not al 1 - important , contractors
feel that a well-written Section M articulates what the
Government deems important in evaluating proposals and
awarding a contract. Section M of some RFPs explicitly state
the weighting of cost, technical. and management factors,
Subfactors within these evaluation factors receive no mention
in some RFPs while other RFPs detail the rationale behind the
subfactors and their relative importance in descending order.
Likewise, some RFPs will go into great detail about the
mechanics that will be used in evaluating offers for award
purposes while other RFPs are terse about such matters.
Each Navy contracting activity should tailor the wording
of Section M of RFPs to each procurement. The tendency in
the Navy is to use a "boilerplate" Section M taken from a
generic Source Selection Plan. There is no one method to
articulate the evaluation factors for award to offerors.
However, RFPs that disclose relative weights of factors,
narrative discussion of subfactor elements and their weights,
and details of evaluation methodology enhance communication
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between Government and industry. An appropriate Evaluation
Factors For Award (Section M of the RFP) is offered in
Appendix C.
3. The Navy does not perform cost realism analyses for
ESS contracts effectively.
Cost realism analysis is a controversial issue in the
ESS arena. Price or cost to the Government must be included
as a specific evaluation criterion in every procurement. The
Navy usually scores each cost or price proposal for cost
realism whereas Army, Air Force, and NASA contracting
activities do not. Instead, these non-Navy activities often
state, "Award will be based on an integrated assessment of
each offeror's ability to satisfy the requirements of the
solicitation." When a best value approach is used for ESS
procurements, the Navy's ASN (S & L) has decreed the use of a
t echni cal /cost ratio of 60/40 as the norm. Instances where a
70/30 techni cal /cos t ratio are proposed must be fully
justified. The guidelines for best value Navy Field
Contracting System (NFCS) ESS acquisitions follow:
Technical/Cost Ratio 70/30 - 60/40 Usually "White Collar"
or Professional Services" fairly well defined with little
need for alternate technical or management approaches.
Involves great use of individual di scret ion/ judgment/in-
sight rather than application of purely mechanical
skills. A premium is considered acceptable to obtain
added value/benefit often associated with greater
per sonnel /corporate experience. [Ref. 8: Attachment (D)
to End osure ( 1 ) ]
The guidelines for NFCS ESS acquisitions procured under
the low cost, technically acceptable method follow:
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"Low Cost, Technically Acceptable" - This approach first
identifies all proposals meeting a stipulated roinimum
level of technical acceptability, then awards to the
lowest cost proposal within the group. It is not a
"greatest value" approach since "scoring" of proposals in
accordance with a predetermined ratio is not employed.
This approach is most frequently employed for standard
production contracts and "blue collar" or "technical"
services characterized by well defined SOWs. It should
not be inferred that this style evaluation necessarily
considers technical factors "less important" than cost,
or than shown in "greatest value" approaches. Rather, it
may be employed whenever minimum technical acceptability
may be narrowly and explicitly defined. It should be
remembered that "minimum" standards may be set as high as
necessary to meet the Government's needs. [Ref. 8:
Attachment (D) to Enclosure (1)]
Cost realism analysis is important in Navy ESS
procurements because of the preponderance of cost-type
contracts used. A contractor may submit an overly optimistic
low-cost proposal which wins the award, but the Government
ends up paying for all allowable, allocable, and reasonable
costs incurred in a cost reimbursable contract. Many
Government personnel interviewed by the researcher referred
to this practice as "high-tech technical proposals submitted
with low-tech cost proposals". Industry retorts that the
Government continues to award to the low-cost offeror
regardless of how off-base and unrealistic a proposal might
appear
.
Nearly every Navy activity contacted by the researcher
approaches cost realism differently. Some activities keep
extensive local records on current and historical labor rates
paid by ESS contractors within a geographical area. If the
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average annual salary for a senior engineer is $65,000 in a
geographical area, an hourly rate equating to a $40,000
annual salary denotes a "lowball" bid for that labor
category. Other activities use Department of Defense (DOD)
or Service plant representative office field pricing reports
and Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) audits extensively
when analyzing cost proposals. A variety of methodologies
are used by Navy source selection teams to develop
Independent Government Cost Estimates (IGCEs) or Most
Probable Cost Estimates (MPCEs). For nonprofessional
personnel subject to minimum wages imposed by the Service
Contract Act, wage determinations provided by the Department
of Labor (DOL) provide a yardstick to compare whether a labor
rate proposal complies with the law.
ASN (S & L) has provided the following guidance on cost
realism analysis to its acquisition personnel:
COST REALISM ANALYSIS: Use of competition as a business
strategy implies fair and impartial source selection
procedures. Recent changes to the way we do business,
such as award on initial proposals, when appropriate, and
not requiring cost or pricing data certifications or
audits when competition is anticipated, bring added
responsibility for both contracting and technical
personnel involved in making award decisions. In
competitive situations, where award may be made on
initial offers, or where technical discussions may be
required but award is envisioned without use of cost or
pricing data, the cost realism analysis (CRA) must be
conducted in a comprehensive and impartial manner. The
CRA used will be necessarily different for each award and
must be carefully planned. The CRA must be carefully
reviewed to ensure it provides no advantages or
disadvantages to any of the competitors. The review must
be comprehensive, paying attention to all provisions of
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the Request for Proposal which offerors must comply with
and ensure that all competitors have an equal opportunity
to comply. While there may be differences between
contractors which allow better scoring, there should be
no aspects of the CRA which unfairly provide an advantage
to any competitor. [Ref. 9:p. 1]
AWARD TO THE LOWEST BIDDER? Occasionally we still hear
of a procurement activity stating it is their policy to
make award strictly to the lowest bidder. This kind of
statement results in industry allegations that the Navy
exhibits a "low-bidder" mentality and assertions that the
Navy is not concerned with quality. The Competition
Advocate General has always stated that the objective of
competition is to obtain the required quality of goods
and services at the best price obtainable. Attainment of
the required level of quality in both goods and services
must remain our paramount objective. [Ref. lOtp. 1-2]
UNREASONABLY LOW HOURLY RATES ON CONTRACTS: Recent
reviews of Navy competitively awarded support service
contracts identified instances of contracts with
extremely low personnel compensation rates. In some
cases the contractors have acknowledged offering rates
well below that which will actually be paid. They also
acknowledge the requirement to deliver the quality of
personnel specified in the contract even though the
Government will pay a rate well below what will likely be
paid to employees.
This practice is a form of buying-in. While not
prohibited by procurement regulations, it is a practice
which can distort the competitive process and raise
questions about the quality of services the Navy is
buying. For these reasons, the practice should not be
encouraged
.
In order to protect the Government's interest. Navy
contracting activities should include in each cost type
contract solicitation for support services notification
that the realism of personnel compensation rates will be
a part of the proposal evaluation. For fixed price labor
hours, or time and material type contracts, a cost
realism may be appropriate where proposal evaluation
considers both price and technical factors. In all
cases, the solicitation will state that unrealistic rates
will be considered in the risk assessment and may result
in a reduced technical score.
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Discussions must be held with contractors proposing
unreal i st i cal ly low rates, (assuming contractors are in
the competitive range) and such contractors will be
required to:
- demonstrate an understanding of the requirement for which
unreal i st i cal ly low rates are proposed;
- address the ability to provide the caliber of labor
r equi red
;
- demonstrate the capability to absorb the labor cost
differential between the low rates proposed and the
probable real cost of the labor to meet Navy
requirements; and
- understand that the Navy fully expects to order the
effort under the low priced rate categories and that the
contractor's performance will be carefully assessed to
ensure that the appropriate caliber of support was
provided. In addition, it should clearly be highlighted
to such contractors that options will only be exercised
if the contractor's performance is fully satisfactory.
The Navy expects to pay fair and reasonable prices for
required supplies and services. Even after the steps
outlined above are implemented, there still may be
instances in which a contractor engages in the practice
and is evaluated as the successful offeror. In such
instances, the Navy will award the contract, order the
low price support effort and monitor it with great care
to ensure that we obtain the caliber of support we need
and contracted for regardless of the contractor's pricing
deci si on
.
All support contract evaluations and clearances are to
include a review which addresses the above issue. [Ref.
ll:p. 1-21
By comparison, the Air Force policy on cost realism for
acquisitions exceeding $5 million follows:
COMPARATIVE COST ANALYSIS: The reasonableness, realism,
and completeness of each contractor's cost proposal
should be explained. This section includes data
pertaining to cost or price analysis, independent cost
analysis, total cost to the government. Most Probable
Cost, impact of technical uncertainty on cost or price.
Life Cycle Cost, or other cost considerations as
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appropriate. A summary track of costs from initial
proposal through BAFO will be provided. Confidence that
can be placed in the cost or price estimate and financial
risks should also be explained. [Ref. 12: Appendix BB
,
Attachment 14]
The aforementioned Navy and Air Force policy
guidance thoroughly addresses the aims of cost realism
analysis. One of the problems encountered in practice is
ensuring a bona fide independent Government cost estimate
(IGCE). A Navy interviewee stated that one IGCE submitted
consisted of a word-for-word rendition of a contractor's cost
proposal where the contractor's letterhead was replaced with
a Government letterhead. This false IGCE was subsequently
detected by members of that source selection team.
Industry has criticized the Navy heavily for failure to
recognize cost proposals containing "throwaway" labor rates.
In one contract award, the winning low bidder on a time and
materials type contract bid $4.05 per hour for clerical
labor. This "fully burdened" fixed hourly rate includes
profit, overhead, and general and administrative expenses.
The nonburdened wage to be paid to clerical personnel would
approximate $3.25 per hour, a figure both below the Federal
minimum wage and less than what fast food workers make. To
make up for the loss the contractor would incur on clerical
effort and a couple other "throwaway" categories, the hourly
rates for several senior engineering and technical personnel
were hiked above market norms. The offeror successfully
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manipulated the wage rates so that the overall composite
labor rate submitted in its cost proposal was lower than
other competitors. By avoiding the use of clerical personnel
and other "throwaway" personnel and by maximizing the use of
high profit margin senior personnel in task accomplishment,
the contractor planned on "gaming" the system in contract
performance. In one case, the Military Sealift Command was
upheld by the General Accounting Office (GAO) when it
rejected the low offeror's proposal for employing "throwaway"
rates. A synopsis of the GAO decision follows:
GAO DECISION ; In Stanley Associates Inc. B-232361 dated
12/22/88. the Military Sealift Command (MSC) was
justified in rejecting the low offeror who, on a contract
for engineering services, proposed charging
disproportionately low rates for junior analysts and high
rates for all other positions, thereby creating an
unacceptable cost risk. It was MSC's view that the
protestor's pricing structure created an incentive to
direct the work toward the higher-priced categories,
although the solicitation had contemplated that the
junior analyst category would make up most of the hours
to be ordered. The protestor argued that MSC was
protected against such manipulation of the task orders,
since the contract gave the Government the right to
direct the labor category mix. Disagreeing, GAO pointed
out that it is the contractor who submits the specific
proposals for performing the tasks identified by the
agency. MSC could specify the labor mix, but would rely
heavily on the contractor's assessment of what would be
required to accomplish the tasks, GAO explained.
Further, although the agency would try to control the
labor mix, the fact that there is a disproportionately
low rate in the most significant labor category created
the likelihood of disagreements over the task orders, a
factor the agency is entitled to consider in deciding
whether to accept this type of offer. Although the
agency never specifically identified the low rate as a
deficiency, it did ask the protestor to verify the rate
and also issued two solicitation amendments emphasizing
the agency's authority to specify the labor mix.
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Further, in at least two oral negotiating sessions the
problem of disproportionately low rates was discussed.
Hence, the protestor had sufficient notice that the
agency was concerned about its rates in general, and the
low junior analyst rate in particular. [Ref. 13:p. 1-2]
Industry personnel interviewed by the researcher offered
the following suggestions to improve cost realism analysis in
Navy ESS contracting:
1. When formulating an IGCE, develop a baseline to compare
with cost proposals. Understand how cost, overhead,
general and administrative expense, and the use of cost
accounting standards are built into contractor
proposal s
.
2. Maintain records of past cost performance by
cont ractors .
3. Maintain market data bases.
4. Identify unusual departures from reasonable norms.
5. Understand the real impact of unusual devices to
regulate costs, such as uncompensated overtime.
6. Question unusual modifications to financial models,
such as no or low fee, low general and administrative
(G & A) expense and low fringe benefits.
The researcher believes the six aforementioned
recommendations have merit. Like most Government agencies,
the Navy has been slow to make strides in capturing past
performance data for use as an ESS source selection
criterion. Likewise, market data bases are virtually
nonexistent. DOL has access to various market indices but
this information is not shared with other Government
agencies. An ex-Navy contractor employee interviewed stated,
"The Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) has reams of data to
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tell you what an airplane should cost. For ESS, however, the
Navy lacks good data bases to provide a good basis for cost."
The four other recommendations cited above have been used
to various degrees by Navy agencies. To streamline its
guidance on cost realism. ASN (S & L) should borrow heavily
from the aforementioned Air Force "comparative cost analysis"
procedures contained in Air Force Regulation 70-30, dated 27
April 1988. By evaluating the reasonableness, realism, and
completeness of each contractor's proposal and developing an
independent Government cost estimate. Most Probable Cost, and
technical uncertainty impact statement on cost, Navy cost
realism analyses can be conducted in a more uniform manner
while tailoring each analysis to the services being acquired.
ASN (S & L) should also explore the possibility of obtaining
Department of Labor (DOL) market indices and related ESS data
for use by source selection teams at Navy systems commands
and field contracting activities. Lastly, the progress of
NAVAIR's efforts to incorporate ESS data into a data base
should be assessed to determine whether data base information
management is an efficient and effective tool that can be
applied elsewhere at Navy contracting activities.
4. Gaming techniques are employed by contractors when
significantly high weight is given to cost in the
evaluation criteria. Contractors can be expected to
provide very optimistic cost estimates when the
evaluation criteria is low cost, technically
acceptable or when cost is weighted at 40 percent or
higher in best value procurements.
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Charges of "gaming" are not confined to low cost
bidding practices or the use of uncompensated overtime.
Industry says contractors are submitting distorted bids,
"bait and switch" resumes, and distorted resumes.
"Throwaway" labor categories, unreal i st i cal 1 y low overhead
cost centers, and creative accounting practices round out
these "smoke and mirrors" ploys. Lastly, industry argues
that real costs do not go away and may take the form of
project overruns or underdel i vered hours.
The unanimous sentiment among the contractors
interviewed is that "low cost means everything" to the
Government when the evaluation criteria is low cost,
technically acceptable or when cost is weighted at 40 percent
or higher in best value acquisitions. Several Navy personnel
and one Army interviewee noted that because technical
evaluation teams often find it hard to "discriminate" between
the relative merits of highly competitive technical
proposals, cost often becomes the deciding issue in
determining the award. Prior to tight DOD budget constraints
which began in 1984, most Navy ESS procurements weighted cost
at 30 percent. The increased use of low cost, technically
acceptable ESS buys coupled with ASN (S & L) policy of cost
to be weighted at 40 percent or higher has increased price
competition dramatically. Industry believes that offerors
other than the low bidder are doomed to be losers in Navy ESS
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buys whereas other Federal agencies are perceived to be more
concerned about quality and other non-price considerations.
The chief recommendations offered by industry are
twofold. First, the Navy should greatly curtail the use of
low cost, technically acceptable contracting in acquisitions
having some degree of engineering expertise required.
Second, the Navy should use techni cal /cost ratios of 70/30 or
lower rather than the mandated 60/40 norm presently used in
best value buys. Industry believes that greater emphasis on
quality and less emphasis on price will result in less
"gaming" and an improvement in the professional and technical
service industry's reputation.
Among Navy contracting and technical personnel
interviewed, support for the best value contracting method
was widespread. One interviewee said the Navy should use
Invitations For Bids (IFBs) for "low tech" buys employing the
low cost, technically acceptable method. He also stated that
the Navy's use of RFPs indicated a historical willingness to
reward contracts to offerors submitting superior proposals
with other than low cost bids. Now, "some RFPs are saying
that a technical proposal is not desired." Some Navy
activities state in Section M (Evaluation Factors For Award)
of RFPs that offers 30 percent higher than the lowest
reasonable and realistic offer will be considered in
instances where quality acquisitions are desired but funding
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constraints place a limit on costs. A hybrid of the low
cost, technically acceptable method and the greatest value
method resul ts
.
The ASN (S & L) draft memorandum shown in Appendix A
proposes to do away with scoring of cost proposals in best
value buys. This policy should be adopted on a trial program
basis at minimum. The Army, Air Force, and NASA do not score
price or cost. Although the contractor knows technical
receives a greater weight than price, the basis of an award
being "an integrated assessment of technical and price/cost"
does away with the current t echni cal /cos t mix of 60/40. A
narrative, fully justified assessment of each cost proposal
lends itself to better analysis of cost realism. "Gaming" of
technical and cost proposals must also be penalized through
reduced technical scores and narrative analysis of
unrealistic costs addressing deficiencies. Past performance
must also become a major factor in award to reward superior
performance and discriminate against poor performance. Past
performance data can also provide a case-by -case basis for
whether a requiring activity's objectives are better met by
best value contracting rather than low cost, technically
acceptable buys. With the Navy and industry stalemated on
these issues, the aforementioned innovations offer promise in
making better informed award decisions, meeting the quality
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needs of requiring activities, and incent i vi z ing contractors
to cease "gaining" and focus on technical proficiency.
5. The Navy should use some form of formal source
selection model for high dollar value procurements,
as the Army, Air Force, NASA, and other Federal
agencies do.
Greater use of the formal source selection process
leads to better quality buys while adding greater fairness
and objectivity to the award decision, several contractors
asserted. The Navy uses contracting officers almost
exclusively in ESS procurements, which typically range from
$10-50 million for most contract actions but sometimes run
higher. Contractors that have dealt with the Navy, Army, Air
Force, NASA, and other Federal agencies, believe that an
informed Source Selection Authority (SSA), advised by a
Source Selection Advisory Council (SSAC) and a Source
Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB), makes better business
decisions in high dollar value procurements than in source
selections made by contracting officers.
Army and Air Force commands make heavy use of formal
source selection procedures. The Air Force Systems Command
(AFSC), for instance, delegates to all of its product
division commanders the authority to act as SSA on research,
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) buys less than $311
million. In practice, product division commanders redelegate
some of this authority to subordinate commands. For example,
at the Air Force Space Systems Division, Los Angeles, Ca.,
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the commanding general serves as SSA for acquisitions of $40
million and up. He may also delegate authority to the vice-
coDomander level for $20-40 million procurements, which may in
turn delegate colonels to act as SSAs for buys less than $20
million. For buys valued at less than $5 million,
contracting officers or technical managers may make award
deci s ions
.
Army and Air Force SSEBs employ briefing charts in
their presentations to SSAs in ESS procurements. In some
cases, over 200 briefing charts were used to brief SSAs at
the lowest assigned area for each source selection evaluation
factor level. Prior to the SSA's award decision, the SSEB
will brief the SSA on its competitive range determination and
the recommended contract awardee. Factor levels, typically
16 in Air Force buys, are typically scored by color codes at
every factor and subfactor level. Evaluation factors such as
proposal risk, performance risk, subcontractor plans, small
disadvantaged business plans, facilities, and secret
clearances will then be included in the integrated
assessment, which includes cost, made by the SSA.
One contractor recommended that commanding officers
of Navy program offices and regional contracting centers
serve as SSAs for procurements of $10 million and up.
However, unlike the Army and Air Force, the Navy has far
fewer dedicated civilian and uniformed contracting personnel
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resources to handle procurements of that magnitude. Some
lower echelon commands might welcome the opportunity to serve
as SSAs for ESS buys of $10 million and up within their
program offices. A common complaint voiced by requiring
activities is the failure of contract awardees to deliver the
level of quality performance demanded and expected. The
present system of awarding contracts is not working and fails
to meet operational needs impacting combat readiness.
Although the argument against more formal source selections
says they are more time-consuming and require more paperwork,
they need not be so in ESS acquisitions. The Air Force tries
to streamline its ESS formal source selections by keeping
factors and subfactors to the bare minimum while making a
strong effort to meet procurement administrative lead time
mi 1 es tones
.
The Navy should initiate a pilot program within a
contracting region to weigh the costs and benefits of
formalizing source selections for awards that are currently
decided by a contracting officer. For instance, requiring
activities such as Pacific Missile Test Center, Point Mugu,
Ca. and Naval Ship Weapon Systems Engineering Station, Port
Hueneme, Ca., which both come under the contracting
cognizance of Naval Regional Contracting Center, San Diego
Detachment, Long Beach, Ca., deal with highly technical ESS
requirements that lend themselves to more formal source
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selections for large dollar procurements. If the delegation
of SSA authority to lower echelon conunands proves successful,
a more formalized source selection process along the lines of
the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) might be considered for
Navywide application. In the meantime, the researcher
recommends that ASN (S&L) explore possible requiring activity
candidates for a pilot program of formal source selections
for ESS acquisitions of $20 million and up.
6. Navy procurement administrative lead time (PALT) has
continued to lengthen due to the growing number of
regulations and the increasing complexity of the
competitive procurement process.
The Navy procurement process for ESS buys is far too
long and cumbersome compared to other Federal agencies,
contractors argue. Poor planning and execution is revealed
in too many cases of multiple amendments to RFPs leading to
multiple best and final offer (BAFO) requests, they contend.
From the development of an acquisition plan to time of award
often takes more than two years in Navy ESS buys, whereas the
Army, Air Force, NASA, and other Federal agencies are able to
accomplish these tasks in 12 to 18 months.
In interviews with Army, Air Force, and NASA
personnel, interviewees related many of the same obstacles to
reduced PALT that Navy personnel encountered. PALT is
defined as the period of time between the release of an RFP
and the announcement of a contract award. The question posed
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to non-Navy personnel by the researcher was, "How are your
activities able to keep PALT between six and 12 months?"
Air Force interviewees related the following
comments
:
We try to make it four months from the time an RFP is on
the street to the award time. Evaluation teams will be
sequestered in one location for three to four weeks. A
recorder will take messages and post them prior to breaks
so that the teams will not be disturbed. By the third
week, SSA briefing charts for the competitive range
determination will be completed.
From the time of procurement request to the time of the
contract award takes six to nine months normally. It is
always less than 12 months though. We are able to meet
or beat our milestones nearly always.
An Army interviewee related the following comments:
I can't say that the Army is more efficient at
acquisition planning. We can usually get an AP written
and approved, and an RFP on the street in six months. To
receive offers, evaluate them, and make an award normally
takes six months. For major source selections, it will
take longer than six months. The total time from the
start of an AP to an award should be one year.
Difficulties include cases of Congressional or DOD
involvement and politically sensitive programs. If
headquarters approves business clearances or requires
more briefings, PALT may take nine to twelve months or
longer. We will try to hand carry the AP up to
headquarters and brief it in person. If we send the AP
by mail, we will get comments back in piecemeal fashion,
with some comments contradicting each other or not
understanding or grasping the issues. If decisions are
not made on the spot at our headquarters briefings,
problems get staffed and take a long time to get
reconciled. For high priority programs, an Army Material
Command (AMC) representative will come to our site to sit
in on a prebusiness clearance and OK it in writing with
our coimnanding general. We have found various ways of
reducing processing time. However, if we follow the
letter of headquarters regulations, we are no better off
than the Navy. Hand carrying of paperwork and doing
things in person are essential in reducing PALT.
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One Navy contractor recommended that pre-business and
post-business clearances be approved by ASN (S & L) shortly
after firms in the competitive range have been identified so
that PALT can be reduced. Currently, greater use of in-
person briefings and conference phone calls, where approvals
and other decisions are made on the spot, will still maintain
the integrity of business clearance yet reduce PALT. For
PALT of six to 12 months to be achieved within the Navy ESS
arena, ambitious, streamlined contracting milestones must be
promulgated and met. Techniques mentioned by Air Force and
Army interviewees to eliminate distractions, cut "red tape",
and accentuate timely decision-making and milestone
attainment need to be incorporated into Navy ESS acquisition
planning and source evaluation and selection. ASN (S&L)
should look into ways of bringing Navy PALT performance into
line with the six to 12 months PALT performance realized by
most Federal agencies.
7. The Navy has not captured past performance history in
situations requiring specialized and high-level
professional talent.
DOD studies such as the Packard Commission Report and
former Secretary of Defense Carlucci's "32 Issues" to improve
the acquisition process have stressed the need for past
contractor performance to be used as a significant source
selection evaluation factor. The Packard Commission Report
made the following comments:
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Federal law and DOD regulations should provide for
substantially increased use of commerc i al -s ty 1
e
competition, emphasizing quality and established
performance as well as price, particularly for research
and development and for professional services. [Ref. 14:
p. 15]
The Carlucci recommendations included the following:
Improve the Source Selection Process . Improve the source
selection process to place added emphasis on past
performance, schedule realism, f aci 1 i t i zat ion plans and
cost credibility. De-emphasize the importance of lowest
proposed cost. Devote more attention to evaluating
contractors' performance during and at the time of
contract completion. Provide award fee contract
structure to encourage good performance. This both
provides an incentive for good performance, and a measure
of contractor performance to be used in future source
evaluations. Establish quality ratings where possible
and ensure these past performance ratings are available
for use by source selection personnel. [Ref. 15:p. 7, 27]
The Air Force has taken steps to use past performance
as a significant evaluation factor in ESS buys. On the other
hand, the Navy is just starting to automate and make
available past performance history to contracting officers
that would prove useful on current source selection
decisions. For example, ASN (S & L) is currently sponsoring
a program known as Red-Yellow-Green which prescribes a
methodology for evaluating and categorizing contractor
quality performance data by Federal Supply Code (FSC) and
using thesedata to assist in the source selection process
during the award determination. A "Red" classification
indicates high risk, "Yellow" for moderate risk and "Green"
for low risk. In determining contractor responsibility,
these color classifications are to serve as only useful
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guides in making an informed business judgment. The premise
behind the Red-Yellow-Green program is to avoid awarding
contracts for services and supplies to unsatisfactory
performers. By adding a monetary assessment to submitted bid
prices, activities can factor in the extra cost to the
Government for effecting satisfactory quality performance.
Ranking of bidders is then on "best price" after the monetary
assessment has been factored into the bid price. To capture
past performance data, a centralized Navy Contractor
Evaluation System (CES) shares quality performance data
obtained from field input with source selection officials. A
one year test of the Red-Yellow-Green contractor evaluation
system was begun at five activities on April 19, 1989 under
the auspices of the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) for
a limited number of FSCs
.
The Air Force is currently attempting to integrate
its data collection system, the Contractor Performance
Assessment Report (CPAR), into a data base system. This
"report card" on contractor performance has thus far
generated more than 300 CPAR reports on 85 contractors.
Contractors are given 30 days to contest any CPAR remarks. A
Government reviewing official can then make a final decision
on the performance marks given. The source selection
sensitive CPAR reports are then filed and safeguarded for use
in future source selections. To ensure a "level playing
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field" in source evaluations and selections, the CPAR
information will only be in instances where all offerors have
a past performance history onhand.
One Air Force interviewee said the CPAR system "works
like an award fee without paying dollars. Contractors know
that future business is at stake." Both industry and Navy
personnel interviewed unanimously felt past performance data
was needed as a major source selection factor. One
contractor interviewed stated:
The Navy shows no corporate memory in cases where a
contractor screws up. A contractor may be late, incur
overruns, or act unr espons
i
vely to a requiring activity.
Three or four months later, the Navy awards them new
business, showing no corporate memory.
One Navy interviewee assigned to a requiring activity
stated:
There is over emphasis on competition and cost in award
criteria coupled with reduced consideration given to
adverse impact on quality and performance over contract
life. Contractor quality and productivity history should
be but are rarely considered in award. Cost realism
becomes a major factor after award instead of preaward.
Past performance and cost realism must become major
factors in award considerations.
The Navy should embark on methods to make a fair,
impartial contractor performance "report card" system a data
source for awarding ESS contracts. The use of such a system
incentivizes a contractor to control costs, make timely
deliveries, and provide quality work in accordance with
Government feedback. The Navy should embark on a manual form
of thf- CPAR system v, i t li th(.' goal of developing a data base
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allowing past performance history to be shared among Navy
activities. While the Red-Yellow-Green and CPAR programs are
based on quality, cost, and schedule performance of
deliverable hardware and software, services are inherently
difficult to quantify, particularly in instances of bad past
performance. Appendix D shows an example of a report card
format used by Contracting Officers' Technical
Representatives (COTRs) at Naval Ship Weapons Systems
Engineering Station, Port Hueneme, Ca. to assess contractor
performance. While numerical scores are assigned by the
evaluator, narrative comments can amplify specific strengths
and weaknesses of the contractor's performance, thus
assisting the contracting officer/SSA in making better sense
of what the contractor's true performance was.
8. Should Total Quality Management (TQM) principles be
incorporated in evaluation criteria for ESS
contracts?
Both industry and Government personnel interviewed
noted that it is hard to get agreement on what TQM is. The
TQM philosophy, championed by W. Edwards Deming and adopted
by a number of Japanese companies, focuses on improving the
work process "constantly and forever". [Ref. 16:p. 132]
Just like past performance, applying a TQM philosophy to
production lines is different than a services environment,
where quality is much more difficult to define and document.
Array and Air Force efforts to put TQM requirements in RFPs
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resulted in contractor plans for "statistical process
control", "total quality programs", and "continuous process
improvement" to be delineated in their technical proposals.
Several ESS contractors have embarked on training
their work forces in the TQM philosophy. Applications in the
ESS arena include flowcharting of tasks and avoidance of
duplication of effort in drafting work, for instance. One
technique to incentivize contractors in producing quality
work the Navy wants is the use of Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF)
contracts, where award fee determinations are based on a
contractor's ability to meet certain parameters of quality
performance. CPAF contracts incentivize contractors to try
to capture as much of the award fee pool as possible. This
seems to be effective and greater use of CPAF contracts in
ESS contracts should be attempted to improve contractor
performance. The researcher, therefore, feels that TQM
principles are too vague and abstract for incorporation as an
evaluation factor for ESS contract awards.
9. Should the contracting function be centralized or
decentralized for the acquisition of mission-specific
equipment and services, including research and
development (R&D)?
This issue was brought to the attention of the
researcher by a number of Government personnel. Some
interviewees wanted contracting officers to be located at or
near their site full-time rather than being headquartered in
Centers of Excellence several hours or miles away. The chief
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complaint from requiring activities is that their technical
needs are not being met by contracting officers who do not
work at or near the program office site, and therefore cannot
appreciate their frustrations in getting important work
accomplished quickly. Some also argue that field activities'
contracting authority should flow from the systems command
they work for, such as NAVAIR or NAVSEA, rather than the Navy
Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP), which oversees Navy Field
Contracting System activities.
In recent years, several Navy requiring activities
have been granted their own on-site contracting authority.
Among these activities are Naval Weapons Center, China Lake,
Ca
.
, Naval Underwater Systems Center, Newport, R.I., and
Naval Weapons Support Center, Crane, In. Navy personnel at
those activities generally agreed that the decentralization
served their needs better in obtaining timely delivery of
mission-specific equipment and professional services by
contracting personnel. The researcher recommends that
requiring activities desiring local procurement authority or
a restructuring of the flow of contracting authority submit
requests for such changes through their chain of command to
ASN (S&L), along with narrative comments from commanders of
program offices citing the relative merits of these changes.
10. The Government should open a better dialogue with
prospective bidders through greater use of
prebidders conferences and draft RFPs requesting
industry input to solicitations.
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Industry interviewees strongly believe these two
tools are superb techniques in fostering better communication
between the Government and offerors prior to the release of
an RFP. One industry interviewee termed draft RFPs "good
insurance policies." By obtaining industry comment on the
wording of SOWs , clarification of sample work directives, and
other contract provisions, the Government and industry
generally see a better RFP that result in better contractor
proposals. Although prebidders conferences are disdained by
some Government personnel who feel "the RFP will be shot full
of holes and tough questions will be asked", others felt they
were a useful tool if strict ground rules on the agenda and
answering of questions were employed.
Although many Navy activities presently use draft
RFPs, the recommendation from industry is to use them most of
the time unless there is a good reason not to. This is
especially true for ESS procurement, where specific contract
requirements are difficult to define in a SOW. Some
contracting activities, such as the Air Force Space Systems
Division, always use draft RFPs for ESS buys because of the
benefits obtained from industry input on highly technical
procurements. An added benefit from frequent use of draft
RFPs is the reduced likelihood of RFP modifications that in
turn result in multiple rounds of BAFO submissions and add to
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procurement action lead time (PALT) and contractor bid and
proposal costs
.
The researcher recommends that Navy activities
maximize their use of draft RFPs and consider greater use of
prebidders conferences to foster better dialogue with
cont Factors .
11. The Navy needs to improve its debriefing conference
for losing offerors.
Navy contracting activities generally received
unfavorable remarks from industry for the manner in which
debriefing conferences for those who were not awarded the
contract were conducted. The chief complaint is the lack of
feedback on where proposals were strong or weak. One
industry interviewee stated:
We see the whole gamut in debriefing conferences. Some
have a guy reading from a piece of paper while others
provide packages or handouts comparing our proposals with
the RFPs.
A secondary complaint is the unwillingness of some
debriefers to answer any questions either at the debriefing
or in writing at a later time. Compared to their Army and
Air Force contracting contemporaries, industry felt Navy
debriefers showed less confidence and knowledge in their
answers to questions posed by losing offerors.
The researcher posed the question to Army and Air
Force interviewees, "How do you conduct your debriefs for
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those who were not awarded the contract?"
interviewee responded:
One Army
We call the contractors in and give them a handout or a
package. We tie the debrief to Section M (Evaluation
Factors For Award) of the RFP, stressing the strengths and
deficiencies of each proposal and also how proposals were
evaluated. In one instance where we handed out thick
packages, we received much better responses to our needs on
the next RFP. We want the contractor to go out with a warm,
fuzzy feeling on how to rectify problems in the future.
An Air Force interviewee stated, "In our debriefs we give
contractors scripts and charts detailing the strengths and
weaknesses of their proposals."
Navj' activities should try to provide written
feedback to losing offerors as a matter of practice in their
debriefs. Although offerors may give the appearance of
expressing "sour grapes" in their manner of questioning
debriefers, Navy contracting activities should try to use
such a forum as a means of enhancing feedback to industry
with the goal that subsequent RFPs will result in better
proposals submitted by offerors.
12. The current FAR should be amended to provide
adequate recognition of the technical and services
industry and guidance of these services.
The general feeling from industry is that service
contracts do not receive the high level of visibility
inherent in production contracts despite the fact that the
S200 billion a year services industry continues to grab a
larger part of the DOD pie. The need for hardware support,
84
integrated logistics support, and program management support
continues to grow at a rapid pace despite shrinking budgets.
The FAR gives little mention of professional and
technical services in part 37 (Service Contracting). No
mention is made of the role of contracting officers'
technical representatives (COTRs), for instance. In the
absence of any explicit regulations, periodic policy
declarations by the Navy and other Federal agencies have
become commonplace. Various proposals offering changes to
the FAR have been submitted by the Professional Services
Council (PSC) to DOD. Further liaison between PSC and DOD,
coupled with input from Government field activities, is
needed to establish baseline regulations for contracting of
engineering and technical support services. Improved FAR
coverage of service contracting will lead to fewer policy
declarations on issues such as source selection and cost
realism, which intended or not, appear conflicting.
C . SUMMARY
The researcher's data analysis and findings were outlined
in this chapter. Twelve pertinent issues in the ESS arena
that impact on the source selection process were analyzed.
The final chapter of this thesis will address the
researcher's conclusions and recommendations concerning
source selection procedures, answer the research questions,
and suggest topics for further research.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
Data presented in this thesis were derived from an
examination of source selection procedures for engineering
support services (ESS) contracts within the Navy. This final
chapter will state the researcher's conclusions as derived
from analysis of these data. This chapter will also include
recommendations for improving the ESS process, answer the




1. Standard work weeks of 45 hours or more for
professional employees are generally undesirable.
Although Government and industry have not resolved
the matter of whether uncompensated overtime (UOT) bidding
practices should he banned or regulated, both parties
generally feel that when standard work weeks exceed 44 hours,
the benefits of the "free" overtime hours the Government
receives are offset by the difficulty to quantify costs of
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) oversight of UOT,
declining employee morale, reduced surge capability, and




2. Navy contracting activities often reveal less
information about ESS source selection evaluation
subfactors than Army, Air Force, and National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
contracting activities.
In examining Section M (Evaluation Factors For Award)
of ten Requests For Proposals (RFPs) issued by Navy, Air
Force, Army, and NASA contracting activities, the researcher
found that Navy RFPs contained little discussion of
evaluation subfactors compared to those of other Federal
agencies. While many Air Force, Army, and NASA RFPs go into
great detail about the rationale behind the subfactors and
the mechanics used in evaluating offers, Navy RFPs are often
terse about such matters.
3. Most Navy contracting activities perform cost realism
analyses differently in ESS procurements.
While Air Force, Army and NASA contracting activities
often receive explicit headquarters guidance on procedures
for evaluating the reasonableness, realism, and completeness
of cost proposals, Navy contracting activities take a less
uniform approach. While Navy activities perform an
independent Government cost estimate (IGCE) as standard
practice, some activities perform a Most Probable Cost (MPC)
analysis for each cost proposal while others do not. Thus
the detail and richness of cost realism analyses varies from
one activity to another.
4. Gaming techniques are largely used by contractors to
offer very optimistic cost bids in a highly
competitive environment.
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When cost is weighted at 40 percent or higher in best
value procurements or when the evaluation method is low cost,
technically acceptable, contractors believe the low cost
offeror invariably will win over contractors submitting
higher quality technical proposals having commensurate cost
estimates for the increased level of quality. While some
Navy contracting activities are adept at detecting,
questioning, and penalizing flagrant gaming practices, such
as "throwaway" labor categories, the researcher viewed a
contract awarded to a offeror bidding clerical labor at a
fully burdened $4.05 hourly rate for a time and materials
contract while inflating the hourly costs of senior
professional employees.
5. Air Force, Army, and NASA contracting agencies often
use the formal source selection process in ESS
procurements whereas the Navy almost exclusively uses
contracting officers to make award decisions.
Product division commanders in the Air Force and Army
actively serve as source selection authorities (SSAs) and
redelegate some of this authority to subordinate commands.
The formal source selection process is perceived by industry
as fairer and more objective in high dollar value ESS
procurements. - {'^A^r^
6. Procurement .^a-eiTTon lead time (PALT) is normally
lengthier in Navy ESS procurements than in Army, Air
Force, and NASA procurements.
Most non-Navy contracting activities award ESS
contracts within six to 12 months after issuance of an RFP.
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Interviewees generally relate that techniques such as hand
carrying of paperwork and "doing things in person" are
essential in reducing PALT. Conference phone calls and in-
person briefings, where approvals and other decisions are
made on the spot, also accentuate timely decision-making and
milestone attainment in Army, Air Force, and NASA
procurements
.
7, The Navy has not yet employed past performance
history to any significant degree in ESS
procurements .
Department of Defense (DOD) studies such as the
Packard Commission Report and former Secretary of Defense
Carlucci's "32 Issues" have stressed the need for past
contractor performance to be used as a significant source
selection factor. The Navy's Red-Yellow-Green program and
the Air Force's Contractor Performance Assessment Report
(CPAR) program have been implemented in procurements of
hardware and supplies. However, little headway has been made
in automating past performance data arising from
procurements. The Air Force's CPAR program for ESS
procurements is working on a manual basis while automation
efforts continue. In the meantime, the Naval Air Systems
Command (NAVAIR) is working on developing a data base to
capture past performance history for ESS procurements.
8. The use of draft RFPs, prebidders conferences, and
wel 1 -s
t
ructur ed debriefing conferences enhances
Government- industry communi cat ion
.
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These communication tools were noted by interviewees
for providing excellent dialogue and feedback that
accentuates the ESS procurement process. Contractors believe
more knowledgeable offers are submitted when these mechanisms
are effectively used.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Navy activities should regulate uncompensated
overtime bidding practices by stating in the RFP that
all offers will be evaluated based on a standard work
week
.
NASA contracting activities often make it a point to
set a "level playing field" while allowing offerors to submit
an additional, alternate approach if considered more
beneficial to the Government. While industry desires a 40
hour standard work week, Navy requiring activities should not
be constrained in specifying a longer work week. However,
standard work weeks of 45 hours or more should be analyzed in
cost benefit terms as to the potential adverse impact of
reduced employee morale, reduced surge capability, and
sloppiness and errors in work performance. The researcher
concludes that a standard work week set by the Government is
the best solution to the Government- indust ry impasse on
whether uncompensated overtime bidding practices should be
banned or regulated.
2. The Navy should strive to reveal more information
about the rationale behind the source selection
factors, subfactors, and their relative importance.
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Each Navy contracting activity should tailor the
wording of Section M (Evaluation Factors For Award) of RFPs
to each procurement, avoiding overreliance on a "boilerplate"
Section M taken from a generic source selection plan. In
addition, thorough discussion of the relative weights of
factors, subfactor elements and their weights, and details of
evaluation methodology should be employed to enhance
Government industry communication.
3. The Navy should streamline its guidance on cost
realism analyses in ESS procurements.
The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Shipbuilding and Logistics) ((ASN (S & L)) can provide
guidelines to Navy contracting activities as to the elements
and purpose of a cost realism analysis. By evaluating the
reasonableness, realism, and completeness of each
contractor's proposal and developing an independent
Government cost estimate. Most Probable Cost for each cost
proposal, and a technical uncertainty impact statement on
cost, Navy cost realism analyses can be conducted in a more
uniform manner while tailoring each analysis to the services
being acquired. ASN (S & L) should also explore the
possibility of obtaining Department of Labor (DOL) market
indices and related ESS data for use by source selection
teams at Navy systems commands and field contracting
activities. Lastly, the progress of NAVAIR's efforts to
incorporate ESS contractor performance data into a data base
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should be assessed to determine whether data base information
management is an efficient and effective tool that can be
applied elsewhere at Navy contracting activities.
4. To discourage gaming of technical and cost proposals,
the Navy should adopt a trial program of replacing
the current 60/40 technical/cost mix in best value
procurements with an award basis being "an integrated
assessment of technical and price/cost."
The Air Force, Array, and NASA do not score cost or
price. A narrative, fully justified assessment of each cost
proposal lends itself to better analysis of cost realism. In
addition, gaming of technical and cost proposals can be
penalized through reduced technical scores and narrative
analysis of unrealistic costs addressing deficiencies. The
60/40 t echni cal /cos t mix can serve as a useful guideline for
relative factor weights, but the contracting officer/SSA
should be given the authority to override these percentages
in making an award decision based on an integrated assessment
of technical and price/cost factors.
5. The Navy should initiate a pilot program within a
contracting region to weigh the costs and benefits of
formalizing source selections for awards that are
currently decided by a contracting officer.
ASN (S & L) should explore possible requiring
activity candidates for a pilot program of formal source
selections for ESS acquisitions of $20 million and up. The
Air Force, Army, and NASA believe that a formal source
selection process for higher dollar ESS procurements results
in a fairer, more objective award decision by a highly
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informed SSA. Navy requiring activities such as Pacific
Missile Test Center, Point Mugu, Ca. and Nav^ Ship Weapon
Systems Engineering Station, Port Hueneme, Ca., which both
come under the contracting cognizance of Navy- Regional
Contracting Center, San Diego Detachment, Long Beach, Ca.,
deal with highly technical ESS requirements that lend
themselves to more formal source selections for large dollar
procurements. If the delegation of SSA authority to lower
echelon commands proves successful, a more formalized source
selection process along the lines of the Air Force Systems
Command (AFSC) might be considered for Navywide application.
6. The Navy should adopt a number of the techniques used
by the Army and Air Force to reduce PALT in ESS
procurements .
The "lessons learned" related by Army and Air Force
interviewees in reducing PALT and streamlining the
acquisition process focused on timely decision-making and the
use of in-person briefings and conference phone calls. For
PALT of six to 12 months to be achieved within the Navy ESS
arena, ambitious, streamlined contracting milestones must be
promulgated and met. ASN (S & L) should encourage such
expedited briefings of prebusiness and postbusiness
clearances as an initial step to reduce PALT while looking
into ways of bringing Navy PALT performance into line with
the six to 12 months PALT performance realized by most
Federal agencies.
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7. The Navy should embark on a manual form of the CPAR
system with the goal of developing a data base
allowing past performance history to be shared among
Navy activities.
The CPAR format allows the use of a "report card"
format in which a contractor can contest the performance
scores assigned but a reviewing official makes a final
determination. By capturing past performance history and
making it a source selection factor, the Navy can make better
awards up front to contractors that have shown superior
demonstrated productivity and quality in work performed.
8. Navy contracting activities should use draft RFFs as
standard practice unless there is a good reason not
to.
The benefits of using draft RFPs in ESS procurements
are widespread. Both Government and industry interviewees
believed the dialogue on RFP wording resulted in a better RFP
and higher quality proposals. The Air Force Space Systems
Division, Los Angeles, Ca
.
, is such a believer in draft RFPs
for highly technical ESS procurements that it employs them as
standard practice.
9. Navy contracting activities should provide written
feedback to losing offerors as a matter of practice
in debriefing conferences.
The strengths and weaknesses of contractor proposals
should be provided to each offeror, tieing in Section M
(Evaluation Factors For Award) of the RFP. Although offerors
may give the appearance of expressing "sour grapes" in their
manner of questioning debriefers, Navy contracting activities
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should try to use such a forum as a means of enhancing
feedback to industry with the goal that subsequent RFPs will
result in better proposals submitted by offerors.
D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question: What are the key problems
in engineering support services contracts and how
might these problems be avoided in order to improve
the contracting process?
As discussed in Chapter I, acquisition of engineering
and technical services involves the buying of a level of
effort from a contractor rather than procuring hardware or
supplies. With these services, the Government is buying
time, knowledge, and expertise. This expertise and knowledge
are very difficult to quantify in a Statement of Work (SOW)
and can only be qualified through personnel educational and
work background requirements written into the solicitation.
Key problems in ESS procurements include uncompensated
overtime bidding practices, "gaming" of technical and cost
proposals, cost realism analysis methodology, disclosure of
source selection factors and subfactors, and the use of past
performance data as a source selection factor. These
problems might be avoided by comparing Navy procurement of
ESS with Air Force, Army, and NASA procurements of similar
services and gleaning "lessons learned" from cognizant
Government personnel. Industry input on how the ESS
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procurement process might he improved was also solicited in
interviews with cognizant industry personnel.
2. Subsidiary Question 1: What are engineering support
services and when are they used?
As previously mentioned, the procurement of
engineering support services (ESS) involves the buying of
time, knowledge, and expertise from a firm in the
professional and technical services industry. A requirement
for ESS is originated when a program office or other Navy
activity defines a requirement for engineering or technical
capabilities not available in-house or at another Navy or DOD
activity. ESS contracts may be used in those cases where the
task to be performed involves the application of skills not
available in-house or such skills would not be economical or
feasible to develop. Unlike most procurements of hardware
and services, requirements originators will often take an
active role in ESS contract administration. The procuring
contracting officer, in tandem with the contracting officer's
technical representative (COTR) assigned in the contract,
will oversee postaward contract performance.
3. Subsidiary Question 2: What problems are encountered
in source competition and selection for engineering
support services contracts?
As discussed in Chapter III, contracting activities
have to discriminate between the relative merits of highly
competitive technical proposals. With tight budgets placing
more emphasis on low cost, "gaming" of cost proposals and
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bidding of uncompensated overtime have become commonplace in
an effort to win Government business. The Government has to
make an informed business decision about which offeror will
prospectively provide the best performance given such a
competitive bidding environment.
4. Subsidiary Question 3: What issues arise when
developing evaluation criteria?
First, the services to be procured must be awarded on
either a best value basis or a low cost, technically
acceptable basis. If the engineering support services to be
procured require a significant degree of engineering
knowledge and expertise, these services should be procured on
a best value basis.
Second, the source selection evaluation team must
decide the scoring schemes (adjectival, color codes, numbers)
it will use to grade offerors' technical and cost proposals.
Furthermore, they must make sense of the tallied scores so
that the contracting officer/SSA can be fully informed of the
relative strengths and weaknesses of the proposals prior to
making the award decision.
Lastly, the contracting activity must decide how to
articulate the source selection factors, subfactors, and
scoring methodology to offerors in Section M (Evaluation
Factors For Award) in the RFP . Contractors want to know more
details about the Navy's rationale for choosing evaluation
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factors and subfactors and assigning relative weights to
them
.
5. Subsidiary Question 4: What are appropriate
evaluation factors (Section M of RFP) for engineering
support services contracts?
As noted in Appendix C, areas of Techni cal /Mi ss ion
Suitability, Cost Factors, Experience and Past Performance
Factors, and Other Factors are appropriate factors for ESS
procurements. Delineation of subfactors and their relative
importance are often provided by Air Force, Army, and NASA
contracting activities, whereas the Navy rarely provides that
level of detail in Section M of RFPs . Past performance is
one evaluation factor that all Federal agencies have had
difficulty incorporating into ESS procurements as an
evaluation factor.
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
1. Examine the training of COTRs and the problems
encountered with assigning responsibility for each ESS
contract to one COTR.
2. Examine problems encountered in ESS contract




MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDERS OF SYSTEMS COMMANDS
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INSTALLATIONS AND
LOGISTICS, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS
COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS RESEARCH,
DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION COMMAND
DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS
COMMANDER, MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND
CHIEF OF NAVAL RESEARCH
COMMANDING OFFICER, AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING
SELECTION OFFICE
COMMANDER, NAVAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMAND
Subj : USE OF NUMERICAL SCORING WHEN EVALUATING PROPOSALS IN
COMPETITIVE NEGOTIATED PROCUREMENTS
In best-value competitive negotiated procurements, the
objective of the source selection process is to determine the
substantive technical differences between the offerors, then
balance those differences with cost to determine the best-value
to the Navy. A variety of scoring methods are used to evaluate
proposals, including adjectives, colors, and numerical scoring.
The evaluation scores are a useful tool to assist in the source
selection decision. However, experience has shown that problems
can occur when numeric scoring procedures are used. Under this
method, cost and technical evaluation factors receive numeric
scores which are added to determine a total point score. Total
point scores are not necessary in making the source selection
decision, and can contribute to selecting an offer which is not
the best value to the Navy.
Therefore as a general policy, I am prohibiting the
assignment of a numeric score to the proposed cost or price in
best-value source selection. This change will focus the source
selection decision on the substantive technical differences
between the offerors and the relative costs, rather than on total
point scores. It will also place emphasis on strong narrative
descriptions and will reinforce the need for a thorough written
discussion of the Navy's source selection decision. Contracting
officers may continue to use numeric scoring in evaluating the
technical portion of an offeror's proposal.
The change does not diminish the importance of cost in the
decision process. While specific percentage weighting on cost is
no longer applicable, cost remains a very important factor in
source selections.
This policy is effective for all source selection plans
approved after the date of this memorandum. The Chief of the
Contracting Office may waive this policy in writing, when full
numeric scoring is justified for a particular procurement.
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APPENDIX B
CALCULATION OF HOURLY RATES FOR PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES
Calculation of Hourly Rates
Standard Method
Annual salary -^ 2,080 hours = Hourly rate
$41,600-2,080 hours = $20.00/hour
Overhead, G&A, etc. (@ 100%) 20.00
Profit (@ 10%) 4.00
Fully burdened hourly rate $44.00/hour
Billable amount for a person-year = 1,856 hours x $44/hour = $81,664
Uncompensated Overtime Method
(Assuming an average 48-hour work week)
Annual salary -^ Actual hours to be
worked plus vaca-
tion/holiday/sick
time, etc. = Hourly rate
$41,600- 2,496 hours =$16.67/hour
Overhead, G&A etc. (@ 100%) 16.67
Profit (@ 10%) 3.33
Fully burdened hourly rate $36.67/hour
Billable amount for a person year = 2,227 hours X $36.67/hour = $81,664
Notes
(1) 1,856 hours is based on 2.080 hours minus 22-1 hours (5.6 weeks) for vacalion/hohday/
sick.
(2) 2.496 hours is based on 52 weeks times 48 hours per week.
(3) 2,227 hours is based on 2,496 hours minus 269 hours for vacation/holiday/sick.
Source : Bauder, Robert E., "Uncompensated Overtime: Is
It In The Government's Best Interest:," Cont r ac t
Management , Issue 7, Vol. 29, July 1989.
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APPENDIX C
RECOMMENDED EVALUATION FACTORS FOR AWARD IN
ENGINEERING SUPPORT SERVICES PROCUREMENTS
Area 1; Techni cal /Mi ss i on Suitability
Element 1, Key Personnel (Factor)
This factor will be used to evaluate the individuals
proposed by the offeror to fill the key positions, and their
ability to perform the functions of the Statement of Work.
Consideration will be given to the resume, reference checks,
and an interview with the person whom the offeror proposes as
Project Manager. Other Key Personnel, whom the offeror
considers to be most important to the success in satisfying
the requirements of this procurement, will also be evaluated.
Element 2, Understanding The Requirement (Factor)
Technical Understanding (Criterion)
The evaluation of this criterion will be based on the
offeror's overall understanding of the requirements of the
various types of projects, their similarities and
differences, the different engineering disciplines involved,
and the interrelationship of these disciplines required for
completion of the work. The offeror's philosophy and
approach to project planning and control to meet the
requirements of the SOW and to ensure completion of a project
on schedule and within cost will also be evaluated. This
criterion will also be used to evaluate any exceptions taken
to the SOW, and supporting rationale for proposed solutions.
Total Compensation Plan (Professional Employees)
(Cr i t er ion
)
This criterion will be used to evaluate the offeror's
plan to fairly compensate the professional staff. In
establishing compensation levels for professional employees,
the total compensation (both salaries and fringe benefits)
proposed, shall reflect a clear understanding of the
requirements of the work to be accomplished and the
suitability of the proposed structure to obtain and retain
qualified personnel to meet mission objectives. The salary
rates and ranges must recognize the distinct differences in
professional skills and the complexity of various disciplines
as well as job difficulty. Proposals offering total
compensation levels less than currently being paid by the
predecessor for the same work will be evaluated, in addition
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to the above, on the basis of maintaining program continuity,
uninterrupted work of quality, and availability of required
competent professional employees. Offerors are cautioned
that instances of lowered compensation for essentially the
same professional work may be considered a lack of sound
management judgment in addition to indicating a lack of
understanding of the requirements. The term "professional
employee" means any person employed in a bona fide
professional capacity as the term is defined in Part 541 of
Title 19, Code of Federal Regulation.
Element 3, Management Plan (Factor)
Management Approach (Criterion)
This criterion will be used to evaluate the offeror's
proposed technical management procedures for directing,
controlling, and reporting the work functions. Consideration
will be given to the offeror's proposed procedure for
internal estimation and the level of signature authority
given to the on-site manager. Evaluation will include the
offeror's approach for management of all work performed by
the offeror and by proposed approach to maintain and improve
the quality of services to be provided.
Organizational Structure (Criterion)
The offeror's planned organizational structure for
accomplishing the requirements of the SOW will be evaluated.
Considerations will include supervisory responsibility, lines
of authority, relationship within the corporate structure and
to proposed/potential subcontractors, and the proposed
interface between the offeror's technical contract manager
and the Navy Contracting Officer's Technical Representative
(COTR). This criterion will be used to examine the autonomy,
authority, and responsibility vested in the local manager,
including such responsibilities as the hiring and firing of
personnel, and approval of salary offers for prospective new
employees. Consideration will also include the local
manager's access to company resources. This criterion will
also be used to examine the authority and responsibility
vested in individual task managers.
Staffing Plan (Criterion)
This criterion will be used to evaluate the offeror's
understanding of the skill mix, expertise, and qualifications
of personnel other than key, and the availability,
distribution, and efficient use of the work force necessary
to support this requirement as demonstrated by the proposed
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staffing plan. The staffing plan will be evaluated to assess
the realism of proposed salaries and wages for non-
professional employees. The total compensation proposed
(salaries, wages, and fringe benefits) must reflect a clear
understanding of the work requirements and competitive hiring
environment of the local job market. In addition, this
criterion will be used to evaluate the offeror's hiring plan,
recruiting methods, and the record of recruiting and
retention success for similar requirements in order to ensure
that the proposed staffing plan will be realized.
Consideration will be given to the methods the offeror
proposes to accomplish ongoing training of personnel. The
phase- in/phase-out plan will also be evaluated in this
criterion. This criterion will include an evaluation of the
offeror's procedures and authority level for making
exceptions to its own staffing policies.
Element 4, Company Resources
To assure scheduled performance for the work functions
in the Statement of Work, it will be advantageous for the
Navy requiring activity if an offeror has broader resources
than those of the on-site staff. This factor will evaluate
the offeror's approach for providing back-up for the Project
Manager, key personnel, and personnel other than key
personnel during absences due to vacation, illness, etc.
Consideration will also be given to techniques used by the
offeror to replace key personnel who leave the contractor's
employment. While the SOW requires that the contractor have
the in-house resources to perform essentially all of the work
that will be required, it is recognized that in the interest
of cost and schedule constraints, some subcontracting for
specialized services may be appropriate. This criterion will
consider such things as specific skills, skill levels, and
disciplines for which the offeror would expect to
subcontract. The corporate identity and geographic location
of proposed subcontractors, where known, will also be
cons idered
.
Area 2; Cost Factors
Proposed costs are analyzed to determine the probable
"cost of doing business" and to identify and weigh features
that could cause a given proposal to cost more or less than
others, and by what amount. Probable cost indicates what
each offeror's proposal will probably cost the Government if
he wins.
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The following factors will be used to evaluate the
proposed cost and to determine the probable cost to the
Government of accepting each proposal. All proposed costs
will be evaluated.
Element 1, Validity of Proposed Cost (Factor)
Proposals will be evaluated to determine their
validity. Any misleading information which may compromise
the validity of the proposed costs may be considered to be
indicative of potential estimating/projection problems.
Element 2. Probable Cost (Factor)
The probable cost is defined as the expected cost to
the Government that will result from accepting a particular
proposal. The initial three (3) year period and two (2) year
priced option period, including the option for Additional
Level of Effort will be considered in the probable cost for
the 2-year option period, and the additional level of effort,
this does not imply an obligation on the part of the
Government to ultimately exercise these options.
Element 3, Probable Cost Difference
Probable cost differences among offerors and their
causes, including those due to differences in business
methods and operating procedures, will be evaluated.
Burdened labor rates will be used as part of the evaluation
in order to identify the overall differences among offerors'
cos t per hour
.
Element 4, Professional Compensation (Factor)
Proposals with unr eal i s t i cal ly low direct labor rates
and/or do not reflect a reasonable relationship of
compensation to professional job categories and experience
levels may be viewed as reflecting a failure to comprehend
the complexity of the contract requirements. This is
predicated on the fact that such compensation may be seen to
impair the contractor's ability to recruit and retain
competent professional employees. The Government is
concerned with the quality and stability of the work force to
be employed on this contract. The compensation data supplied
will be used, in part, to evaluate the offeror's
understanding of the contract requirements.
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Area 3; Experience and Past Performance Factors
Consideration will be given to experience and past
performance data related to relevant programs with both
Government and Industry covering prime and subcontract
performance within the past three (3) years. A proposer's
past performance on relevant or comparable programs will be
examined. Such examination will be to an extent sufficient
to be considered indicative of performance to be expected on
the work under this procurement. This portion of the
evaluation pertains to overall corporate experience, not
individual or key personnel experience. Criteria to be
evaluated under this factor are:
a. The offeror's experience in doing work comparable
to or related to the effort required under this procurement
will be evaluated. The evaluation team will review projects
performed by the offeror which include a comparable magnitude
of effort including technical, cost, schedule or management
elements or constraints similar to those expected in this
requ i rement
.
b. Past performance, or how well an offeror did on
earlier work, is an indicator of how well he can be expected
to perform on this procurement. The evaluation team will
evaluate characteristics such as resiliency, resourcefulness,
and management determination to see that an organization
lives up to certain commitments or standards and skill in
development and utilization of personnel. Our analysis will
be particularly influenced by performance on contracts of
similar cost and complexity pertinent to this contract.
Area 4; Other Factors
Other factors which will be considered in the
evaluation of proposals include:
a. Financial conditions, accounting system capable of
collecting or recording data for a cost reimbursement
contract, business reputation and sufficiency of operating
capi t a 1
.
b. Stability of labor-management relations.
c. Extent of proposed small and disadvantaged
business, and women-owned business participation in the
subcontracting plan; and
d. Use of subcontracts with companies located in labor
surplus areas:
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e. Any information contained in
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/. OUALITY OF PRODUCT OR SERVICE
QUAUTY OF PRODUCT OR SERVICE AS MEASURED ACCORDING
TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATEMENT OF WORK.
2. TIMELINESS
ADHERENCE TO PLANNED TIME PERFORMANCE AND
BENEFITS OF EARLY DEUVERY.
3. TOTAL OR UNIT COST REDUCTION
DOCUMENTED, VALIDATED SAVINGS REALIZED ON THIS CONTRACT
PLUS CREDIT FOR FUTURE SAVINGS.
4. INNOVATIVE PERFORMANCE
GENERATES, IMPLEMENTS. AND DOCUMENTS IDEAS
FOR IMPROVED METHODS WHICH MAKE WORK
MORE PRODUCTIVE, OR OF A HIGHER QUAUTY AT
AN EQUAL OR LOWER COST. PERFORMANCE OF
UNDEFINED ELEMENTS OF A TASK THAT CONTRIBUTE
TO THE END RESULT.
5. ELECTIVE ELEMENT
AN ITEM OF CONCERN UNIQUE TO THE PERFORMANCE
OF THE STATEMENT OF WORK NEGOTIATED BY THE COTR
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The following is a list of people who were interviewed or
directly provided information necessary for this research.
Interviews consisted of both telephone conversations and
personal visits.
Anderson, CDR , SC, USN, Military Sealift Command,
Washington, D.C., September 7, 1989.
Ange, S., Acquisition Officer, Navy Ship Weapon Systems
Engineering Station, Port Hueneme, Ca., July 17, 1989.
Bachman, M., Division Head, Navy Regional Contracting
Center, San Diego, Ca., July 28, 1989.
Banks, A., Division Manager, Naval Weapons Center, Crane,
In., August 8, 1989.
Boalick, R., Project Manager, ANADAC, Inc., Arlington,
Va., various, July-September 1989.
Brooks, J., Program Analyst, Weapons Evaluation
Directorate, Pacific Missile Test Center, Point Mugu, Ca.,
July 17, 1989.
Brostrom, K., Director, Corporate Development, Vitro
Corp., Silver Spring, Md., various, July-September 1989.
Cheney, J., CAPT , SC, USN, Naval Supply Systems Command,
Washington, D.C., June 14, 1989.
Conklin, B., Vice-President, Planning Research Corp.,
McLean, Va., various, August-September 1989.
Conote, P., Price Analyst, U.S. Air Force Space Systems
Division, Los Angeles, Ca., October 5, 1989.
Covey, C, Acting Director of Cost, Pricing, and Finance,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C., August
28, 1989.
Dell, M., Procuring Contracting Officer, Navy Regional
Contracting Center, San Diego, Ca., July 28, 1989.
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Dillon, S., Branch Head, Naval Air Systems Command,
Washington, D.C., various, August-September 1989.
Dowling, R., LCDR, SC, USN, Office of Assistant Secretary
of the Navy (Shipbuilding and Logistics), Washington, D.C.,
various, April-August 1989.
Dutra, B., Procuring Contracting Officer, Naval
Underwater Systems Center, Newport, R. I
.
, August 8, 1989.
Dunaway, C, Consultant, United Information Services,
Beltsville, Md., August 11, 1989.
Ervine, D. , President, VSE Corp., Alexandria, Va.,
various, August September 1989.
Ford, F., Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Shipbuilding and Logistics), Washington, D.C., May 19, 1989.
Foss, J., Acquisition Officer, Weapons Evaluation
Directorate, Pacific Missile Test Center, Point Mugu, Ca.,
July 17. 1989.
Greathouse, M., Director of Corporate Communications,
Vitro Corp., Silver Spring, Md., August 4, 1989.
Hanna, J., Director of Special Projects, Engineering
Visions Corp., San Diego, Ca., September 26, 1989.
Hanson, C., Procurement Analyst, Naval Underwater Systems
Center, Newport, R.I., August 8, 1989.
Hauenstein, W., RADM , SC, USN, Competition Advocate of
the Navy, Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Shipbuilding and Logistics), February 2, 1989.
Jarman, J,, Vice-President, VSE Corp., Alexandria, Va.,
September 6, 1989.
LaFollette, C, Director of Contracts, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Ames Research
Center, Moffett Field, Ca
.
, October 6, 1989.
Larsen, D., Legal Counsel, Navy Regional Contracting
Center, San Diego Detachment, Long Beach, Ca., July 17, 1989.
Larson, M., Resident Supervisor, Defense Contract Audit
Agency Headquarters, Alexandria, Va., August 10, 1989.
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Lasswell, J., Manager of San Diego Operations, Systems




Losquadro, J., Vice-President, VSE Corp., Alexandria,
Va., various. September-November 1989.
McDevitt, B., Director of Contracts, Navy Regional
Contracting Center, Philadelphia, Pa., July 27, 1989.
McKamey, V., Source Selection Policy Staff, U.S. Army
Material Command, Washington, D.C., September 13, 1989.
Meyer, T., Branch Chief, Research, Development, and
Engineering Procurement Division, U.S. Army Tank-Automotive
Command, Warren, Mi., various, October 1989.
Miller, R., Ordering Officer, Naval Weapons Center, China
Lake, Ca
.
, August 11, 1989.
Oeters, H., Supervisor Contract Negotiator, U.S. Air
Force, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Oh.,
September 11, 1989.
Peckham, D. , Head of Policy and Procedures, Naval
Underwater Systems Center, Newport, R.I., August 8, 1989.
Pollen, E., Division Head, Navy Regional Contracting
Center, San Diego Detachment, Long Beach, Ca., July 14, 1989.
Pollock, W., CAPT, SC, USN, Military Sealift Command,
Washington, D.C., September 7, 1989.
Richter, R., Acquisition Officer, Navy Ship Weapon
Systems Engineering Station, Port Hueneme, Ca., July 17,
1989.
Santos, T., Procuring Contracting Officer, Navy Regional
Contracting Center, San Diego, Ca., July 28, 1989.
Scott, S., Division Head, Naval Weapons Center, China
Lake, Ca., August 11, 1989.
Seger, B., Naval Ship Systems Engineering Station,
Philadelphia, Pa., July 5, 1989.
Shultz, M., Executive Director, Professional Services
Council, Washington, D.C., various, August 1989.
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Sueur, R. , CDR , SC, USN, Navy Regional Contracting
Center, San Diego Detachment, Long Beach, Ca., July 14, 1989.
Tomlinson, D. , CDR, SC, USN, Naval Supply Systems
Command, Washington, D.C., September 8, 1989.
Vranicar, G., Contracts Supervisor, U.S. Air Force Space
Systems Division, Los Angeles, Ca., various, October 1989.
Wasson. S., Procuring Contracting Officer, Navy Regional
Contracting Center, San Diego, Ca., July 28, 1989.
Wend, D. , Contracts Supervisor, U.S. Army Tank-Automotive
Command, Warren, Mi., October 5, 1989.
Wight, T., LCDR, SC, USN, Military Sealift Command,
Washington, D.C., September 7, 1989.
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U.S. Army Logistics Management Center
Fort Lee, Virginia 23801
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Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5002
4. CDR Neil Hart, Code 54Hr 1
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000
5. Prof. David V. Lamm. Code 54Lt 5
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000
6. ANADAC, Inc. 1
Attn: Mr. H. Russell Boalick
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1735 Jefferson Davis Highway
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7. Planning Research Corporation 1
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Washington. D.C. 20362-5101
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Washington, D.C. 20361
13. Department of the Navy
Naval Air Systems Command
Attn: Ms. Joyce Akton
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14. Professional Services Council
Attn: Mr. Mark Shultz
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Washington, D.C. 20006
15. Department of the Navy
Naval Ship Weapon Systems Engineering Station
Attn: Mr. Sal Ange
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Office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy
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Attn: Ms. Ellen Pollen
Long Beach, California 90822
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Washington. D.C. 20376-5000
21. LT Ken Marsh, SC, USN
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